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 ABSTRACT  
Since ancient times, approaches to distinguish between true and deceptive statements have been 
of particular importance in the context of court decisions. However, the applicability of most 
psychophysiological or behavioral measures of deception is critically discussed. Verbal tools for 
credibility assessment, nonetheless, are widely used. They rest on the assumption that the quality 
of statements that are experience-based differs from the quality of fabricated accounts. In order 
to test the validity of two prominent procedures, Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA) and 
Reality Monitoring (RM), a random-effects meta-analysis (REMA) was conducted on 52 English- 
and German-language studies in Meta-Analysis 1. The REMA revealed a large point estimate 
with moderate to large effect sizes in the confidence interval. This finding applied for both 
CBCA and RM, despite the fact that (1) there was a high level of heterogeneity between studies 
that could not be resolved by moderator analyses and, (2) it cannot be ruled out that effect size 
estimates are biased and thus verbal tools for credibility assessment only work to a smaller extent. 
However, a recent simulation study cast doubt on these findings: It showed that the meta-
analytic methods used in Meta-Analysis 1 lead to false-positive rates of up to 100% if data sets 
are biased. To test the robustness of previous findings, a reanalysis with different bias-correcting 
meta-analytic methods was conducted on an updated set of 71 studies in Meta-Analysis 2. The 
overall effect size estimates ranged from a null effect to conventionally large effect sizes. Taking 
into account specific strengths and limitations of each meta-analytic method, results indicated 
that CBCA and RM distinguish between experience-based and fabricated statements with 
moderate to large effect sizes. In contrast, the Scientific Content Analysis (SCAN) – a third 
verbal tool for credibility assessment that was also tested in the updated data set of Meta-Analysis 
2 – did not discriminate between truth and lies and should thus not be used in practice.  
 
  
 
 
 
“AT LEAST, LYING IS THINKING THE TRUTH.” 
Oliver Hassenkamp (translated from German) 
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INTRODUCTION 
The assessment of the credibility of statements in criminal proceedings is an important and 
demanding task of any court and goes back a long way in history. The Ur-Nammu, the oldest 
code of law known today, determined in 2100-2050 B. C. that a “river ordeal” should decide 
whether a man's accusation that his wife had committed fornication was true or not (Finkelstein, 
1968/69). Although today this task is no longer carried out by a “river ordeal”, but by a judge, 
the question has remained the same: Is a statement based on real experience or is it invented? 
Credibility assessment of statements is particularly relevant when there is no other evidence (e.g., 
camera recordings, DNA evidence) at hand, as is often the case with child sexual abuse. In such 
statement-against-statement constellations the judge must decide who is telling the truth: the 
alleged victim or the alleged perpetrator. However, one criticism is that judges are not adequately 
trained in credibility assessment and hence often use invalid, everyday theories (e.g., Jahn, 2001). 
The application of lay theoretical approaches is alarming given the fact when using lay 
approaches humans distinguish between truth and lie hardly better than chance (e.g., Bond & 
DePaulo, 2006; Ekman & O’Sullivan, 1991; Hartwig & Bond, 2011). It is therefore paramount to 
establish objective, reliable, and valid procedures for the assessment of statement credibility in 
court and other contexts (e.g., border security, customs control).  
There are various approaches to investigate differences between true and deceptive responding. 
These approaches use either psychophysiological or behavioral measures of deception, which can 
be further specified. Köhnken (1990) distinguished, for example, non-verbal, para-verbal, and 
verbal content cues. Others have used reaction time as a behavioral indicator of lying or telling 
the truth (e.g., Sartori, Agosta, Zogmaister, Ferrara, & Castiello, 2008). Regardless of their nature, 
measures of deception have been extensively studied for over a hundred years (for a historical 
overview on lie detection research see for example Lykken, 1998). The present meta-analyses are 
the first to synthesize the vast research on different tools for verbal credibility assessment.  
Meta-Analysis 1 and 2 are presented below in chronological order. Meta-analysis 1 summarised 
the state of research on verbal tools of credibility assessment up to the year 2015 and, in 
comparison to previous research syntheses up to that point, enabled a comprehensive assessment 
of verbal tool’s validity that is highly relevant for legal psychologists working in science and 
practice. However, a simulation study by Carter et al. (2019), which investigated the performance 
of different meta-analytical methods, cast doubt on the results of Meta-Analysis 1. These findings 
motivated me to reanalyse previous and newly added data using different meta-analytic methods. 
Meta-Analysis 2 is thus an update that synthesized research up to the year 2018 and was designed 
taking into account the latest state of research on meta-analytical methods.   
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MEASURES OF DECEPTION  
Psychophysiological measures capture parameters of the autonomous (e.g., electrodermal activity, 
heart rate) or central nervous system (e.g., event-related potential) that are expected to differ 
depending on whether a person lies or responds truthfully. A recent meta-analysis by Leue and 
Beauducel (2019) demonstrated that the parietal P3 amplitude of event-related potential reliably 
reflected (a) the recognition of salient information that had to be concealed (larger P3 following 
more salient information compared to true responding to unknown stimuli; δ = 0.95) and (b) 
increased mental effort of concealing knowledge compared to true responding to known stimuli 
(smaller P3 following more demanding information; δ = -0.52). Suchotzki, Verschuere, 
Bockstaele, Ben-Shakhar, and Crombez (2017) investigated various behavioral measures of 
deception that used reaction time. A meta-analysis of 114 studies using the autobiographical Implicit 
Association Test (Sartori et al., 2008), the Concealed Information Test (Lykken, 1959), the Sheffield Lie 
Test (Spence et al., 2001), or the Differentiation of Deception Paradigm (Furedy, Davis, & Gurevich, 
1988) revealed a large effect for standardized reaction time differences between true and 
deceptive responses (d = 1.049). Although these results sound promising, it must be noted that 
there is no omnipotent measure of deception, as the famous Pinnochio nose suggests (Volbert & 
Banse, 2014), neither a psychophysiological (e.g., Steller, 2008) nor a behavioral one (see for 
example results of the meta-analysis on 158 behavioral cues of deception by DePaulo et al., 
2003). Whether a measure is a measure of deception depends on the paradigm applied, or vice versa, 
it is the paradigm that determines the psychological processes that a measure reflects (Meijer, 
Verschuere, Gamer, Merckelbach, & Ben-Shakar, 2016). For example, time-delayed responses to 
given words could signal the concealment of crime-related knowledge when combined with a 
Concealed Information Test (Lykken, 1959) or emotional valence when combined with an 
emotional Stroop task (Ben-Haim et al., 2016). Hence, research on deception detection seeks 
paradigms that capture psychological processes involved in lying.  
There are plenty of theories about what psychological processes are related to deception (e.g., 
Buller & Burgoon, 1996; DePaulo et al., 2003; Walczyk, Harris, Duck, & Mulay, 2014; 
Zuckerman et al., 1981). Zuckerman et al. (1981), for example, supposed four factors: (1) an 
increased arousal; (2) negative emotions like guilt, shame, and fear; (3) cognitive aspects; and (4) 
attempts at behavioral control. However, the first two factors in particular are often critically 
discussed: It is repeatedly pointed out that although lying may be associated with an increased 
arousal or negative emotions, increased arousal or negative emotions does not necessarily indicate 
lying (so-called fallacy of reverse inference, Meijer et al., 2016). For example, a person who is telling 
the truth may have a heightened arousal level if he or she is suspected of having committed a 
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crime, or may feel ashamed if he or she reports a sexual offence. These examples illustrate that 
the psychological processes “arousal” and “negative emotions” are not uniquely associated with 
deception. Although individual studies have shown that liars have an increased arousal that is 
unaffected by cognitive load (Vincent & Furedy, 1992) or actually express more negative 
emotional words than truth tellers (e.g., Hauch, Blandón-Gitlin, Masip, & Sporer, 2015), the 
validity of these results should at least be critically questioned as long as the relationship between 
the psychological processes and deception is not established.  
COGNITIVE APPROACH OF DECEPTION DETECTION 
In contrast, the cognitive approach of deception detection looks more promising. It is based on 
the notion that lying is typically cognitively more demanding, or requires more cognitive 
resources in terms of executive control (i.e., response inhibition, working memory updating, and 
shifting; Miyake et al., 2000), than telling the truth. In comparison to experience-based 
statements, lies cannot simply be recalled from memory, but must be constructed while inhibiting 
the truth. In addition, liars have to be careful not to get caught up in contradictions regarding 
their own statements and/or the knowledge of the person being lied to. At the same time, liars 
have to make sure they appear credible and thus constantly monitor their own behavior as well as 
the reaction of the target person to see if their deception is believed or has to be adjusted. To 
accomplish these tasks, the truth needs to be activated in working memory and the mental sets of 
truth and deception must be constantly calibrated. However, these demands of lying do not apply 
under all conditions. There are situations where telling the truth imposes a high amount of 
cognitive load, too. If, for example, an experienced event has not been retrieved for a long time 
and must be actively searched in memory (for further examples see Walczyk et al., 2014), then 
truth telling can require extensive cognitive effort. Conversely, there are situations in which lying 
does not require much cognitive effort. If, for example, a target asks a simple question and 
cannot verify the answer, then telling a lie is not necessarily cognitively taxing.  
Within their Activation-Decision-Construction-Action Theory (ADCAT), Walczyk and colleagues (2014) 
specified under which conditions “serious lying” (i.e., lying in situations where much is at stake) 
actually imposes cognitive load. The authors structure the process of lying in four components: 
The activation component (1) refers to aspects of the social environment that lead respondents 
to understand that true information is requested and then, if possible, retrieved from or encoded 
in working memory. The decision component (2) includes the social context that leads 
respondents to deceive in a certain way or reminds them of their decision to lie. The construction 
component (3) describes the manipulation of information. The action component (4) represents 
execution of the lie. Whether lying demands a high amount of cognitive resources depends, 
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roughly speaking, on the social context, on the evaluation of the consequences of a true or 
deceptive response, on the type of lie, on whether and how well a person is prepared to lie, and 
on the familiarity and complexity of the situation. The authors specified further boundary 
conditions under which each component can impose additional cognitive load and integrate 
empirical evidence of deception detection research in their theoretical framework (for detailed 
information see Walczyk et al., 2014). Although the ADCAT suggests that several boundary 
conditions have to be considered, empirical evidence stresses the assumption that lying is 
associated with a higher cognitive effort than telling the truth. For example, participants reported 
that they experienced lying as cognitively more demanding than telling the truth (e.g., Caso, 
Gnisci, Vrij, & Mann, 2005). Moreover, brain-imaging studies showed that lying is associated 
with activation in brain regions that are also activated in other cognitively demanding tasks (for 
example, the prefrontal cortex; Abe, 2009). In addition, results of a comprehensive meta-analysis 
on reaction time-based measures of deception confirmed the hypothesis that “lying takes time” 
as it is cognitively challenging (Suchotzki et al., 2017, p. 34).  
The fallacy of reverse inference also applies to the cognitive approach of deception detection: 
“That is, even if deceptive responses are differentially associated with brain activation in areas 
associated with cognitive control, we cannot conclude that differential activation in these areas 
necessarily implies that the subject is deceptive (i.e., responses to questions may be associated 
with enhanced cognitive control even when they are truthful). Similarly, the fallacy of reverse 
inference applies to the absence of differential activation: a lack of activation in areas associated 
with inhibition does not necessarily imply that the subject is responding truthfully” (Meijer et al., 
2016, p. 598). It is therefore a great challenge for research on deception detection to develop 
paradigms that tap into psychological processes associated with lying and to capture these 
processes through valid measures. 
VERBAL CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT 
Verbal tools for credibility assessment are linked to the cognitive approach of deception 
detection. Most of these procedures serve to substantiate the truth and not to uncover lies, which 
is why they are labeled as tools for credibility assessment. In principle, verbal tools for credibility 
assessment are based on the notion that experience-based statements are of higher content 
quality than fabricated statements and that these differences are reflected in verbal cues. Verbal 
cues have a long tradition in the history of deception detection. As early as 900 B. C. a papyrus 
Veda stated that a poisoner is recognized, among other characteristics, by the fact that “he speaks 
nonsense” (Trovillo, 1939, p. 849). Since this rather unspecific description, research on verbal 
cues – either measured in isolation (i.e., verbal uncertainty, verbal immediacy; DePaulo et al., 
 12 
2003) or as part of a procedure – has developed. The two most prominent procedures, at least in 
science, are the Criteria-Based Content Analysis (CBCA; Steller & Köhnken, 1989) and Reality 
Monitoring (RM; Johnson & Raye, 1981).  
CRITERIA-BASED CONTENT ANALYSIS 
The CBCA is based on the assumption that experience-based statements are of higher content 
quality than fabricated statements, meaning they are richer in detail and show more elaborate 
links to external events (so-called Undeutsch hypothesis). Since a 1955 ruling of the German 
Supreme Court mandated that psychological experts be consulted in cases of child sexual abuse, a 
large amount of case material was available that led to this observation. In 1967, Udo Undeutsch 
was the first to list reality criteria to capture differences in quality between experience-based and 
fabricated statements. In the following years, Swedish and German experts compiled further lists 
of reality criteria (Arntzen, 1970; Dettenborn, Froehlich, & Szewczyk, 1984; Szewczyk, 1973; 
Trankell, 1971). On this basis, Steller and Köhnken formalized in 1989, more than 30 years after 
the ruling of the German Supreme Court, a set of 19 content1 criteria for statement analysis, 
organized in five categories (see Table 1).  
The first category comprises general characteristics of a statement as a whole, including logical 
consistency, unstructured production, and quantity of details. The second group refers to specific contents, 
such as descriptions of interactions or reproduction of conversations. The third category includes 
peculiarities of content, such as unusual details or accurately reported details that were not comprehended. 
The fourth group addresses motivation-related content, which is concerned with identifying 
statement details that a witness who makes a false statement and does not take his/her credibility 
for granted would not embed, e.g., pardoning the perpetrator. Finally, the last category includes an 
offence-specific element that is detailed characteristic of the offence. 
The CBCA criteria are rated with reference to a verbatim transcript of the statement on an 
alleged event, either as absent/present or with regard to their strength (there are different 
scorings, for example 0 = absent, 1 = present, 2 = strongly present). The presence of criteria is 
interpreted as indicator of truth. Absences of criteria, however, do not indicate deception, 
because there are other reasons why criteria may not be present (e.g., lack of motivation to make 
a statement, simple and short event). Although Arntzen (1970) reported a rule of thumb 
according to which “at least three reality criteria must be given […] in order to classify a 
                                                 
1 Steller and Köhnken (1989) criticised the undifferentiated use of the term “reality criteria”, which refers to several 
aspects of credibility assessment and not only to content analysis. Therefore, the authors preferred the term “content 
criteria”.  
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testimony as credible” (p. 46), Steller and Köhnken (1989) stressed that there are “no formalized 
decision rules […] for determining cutoff scores to differentiate between true and deceptive 
statements” (p. 231). Steller and Köhnken (1989) also pointed out that the occurrence of criteria 
does not depend exclusively on the truth status of a statement, but additionally on personal and 
situational factors. That is, CBCA criteria must not be misunderstood as a simple checklist to 
reveal experience-based or fabricated statements. Rather, the CBCA is one part of a whole 
diagnostic process, the Statement Validity Assessment (SVA) that examines various alternative 
hypotheses for the development a statement.  
Table 1 
CBCA Criteria (Steller & Köhnken, 1989) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the first step of the SVA, the case file is examined in order to derive alternative hypotheses. 
The second step is a semi-structured interview on the event in question. It is important to obtain 
a comprehensive statement in a free narrative style that is not influenced by the interviewer. 
Using a verbatim transcript of the statement, the CBCA is performed in the third step. Finally, to 
answer the question of whether a person could or would have made a particular statement if it 
were not experience-based, the quality of the statement is considered in context of personal and 
General characteristics  
1. Logical consistency 
2. Unstructured production 
3. Quantity of details 
Specific contents 
4. Contextual embedding 
5. Descriptions of interactions 
6. Reproduction of conversation 
7. Unexpected complications during the incident 
Peculiarities of content 
8. Unusual details 
9. Superfluous details 
10. Accurately reported details misunderstood 
11. Related external associations 
12. Accounts of subjective mental state 
13. Attribution of perpetrator’s mental state 
Motivation-related contents 
14. Spontaneous corrections 
15. Admitting lack of memory 
16. Raising doubts about one’s own testimony 
17. Self-deprecation 
18. Pardoning the perpetrator 
Offense-specific element 
19. Detailed characteristic of the offense 
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situational factors that have been summarized in slightly different versions of the so-called 
Validity Checklist (e.g., verbals skills, event characteristics, motives to report, interview style). 
Accordingly, for example, a high quality of a statement might be attributed to an interviewee’s 
being extremely eloquent or verbally skilled. Conversely, a low-quality statement might given if 
the event in question was so simple and short that many criteria could just not occur.  
Furthermore, Steller and Köhnken (1989) have pointed out that individual criteria are of different 
diagnostic value, which is another reason why the CBCA should not be used as a simple 
checklist. For example, reporting a misunderstood detail is more meaningful than a description of 
contextual embedding. In a modification of CBCA criteria 25 years later, Volbert and Steller (2014) 
took up this idea. On the basis of Niehaus (2008), the authors sorted CBCA criteria by new 
aspects that refer to different underlying processes: characteristics of episodic autobiographical 
memory, script-deviant details, and criteria of strategic self-presentation. In addition, they listed 
characteristics for the statement as a whole.  
Characteristics of episodic autobiographical memory include spatiotemporal (e.g., contextual 
embedding, spatial information, temporal information) and self-related criteria (e.g., emotions and feelings, 
own thoughts, sensory impressions). This category refers to the fact that people who tell the truth can 
just fall back on episodic representations, whereas liars must use cognitive scripts and deliberate 
effort to construct a statement. Therefore, experience-based statements should generally be more 
detailed and elaborate than fabricated statements. However, cognitive scripts of liars may also 
include characteristics of episodic autobiographical memory (Volbert & Steller, 2014). In a study 
on the strategic meaning of individual CBCA criteria, Maier, Niehaus, Wachholz, and Volbert 
(2018) showed that deceivers would actually try to embed memory-related information in 
fabricated statements. The authors conclude that both truth tellers and liars are in principle 
motivated to use such criteria, but that embedding such details is more cognitively demanding if 
they are not based on an actual experience. For script-deviant criteria (e.g., unusual details, 
unexpected complications during the incident) the opposite is true. Volbert and Steller (2014) do not 
assume that liars will come up with the idea of incorporating these criteria into their invented 
statements, as they do not fit into the common script of a true statement. Study results of Maier 
et al. (2018) supported this assumption: Deceivers stated to avoid the use of script-deviant 
criteria. The criteria Volbert and Steller (2014) classified as strategic self-presentation should 
reflect the effort to present oneself as credible. Accordingly, liars should avoid, for instance, 
spontaneous corrections, doubts about one’s own testimony, or the expression of uncertainty. Maier et al. (2018) 
confirmed this assumption for seven out of nine criteria of strategic self-presentation. Taken 
together, current research indicates that CBCA criteria differ in their strategic meaning, i.e., liars 
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are either motivated to include or avoid them. Maier and colleagues (2018) pointed out, however, 
that the mere motivation to use a criterion does not necessarily mean that it is actually 
incorporated into a fabricated statement. Whether or not a criterion is included in a statement 
also depends on how cognitively demanding it is. The study results illustrated that the diagnostic 
value of the CBCA criteria needs to be examined more closely.  
The CBCA is admissible evidence in some courts of North America (Ruby & Brigham, 1997) and 
in several West European countries such as Austria, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the 
Netherlands (Köhnken, 2004). Even though the CBCA has been developed on the basis of 
statements in alleged cases of child sexual abuse, many authors assume that it can also be used to 
assess other issues and adult testimonies (e.g., Köhnken, 2004; Köhnken, Schimossek, 
Aschermann, & Höfer, 1995; Porter & Yuille, 1996). 
REALITY-MONITORING 
While the atheoretical character of the CBCA reflects its historical development, namely its 
derivation from practice, the RM approach has a theoretical basis. Johnson and Raye (1981) 
described reality monitoring as a cognitive process by which a person distinguishes between 
experience-based and imagined memories. Based on the idea that memories of experienced 
events have stronger external links than memories of things that have only been imagined, the 
authors described criteria to differentiate the two memory types. Accordingly, externally 
generated memories that originate in perceptual experience should be characterized by 
contextual, sensory, and semantic information, whereas internally generated memories that 
originate from thought or in the imagination should be characterized by references to cognitive 
operations. Johnson, Foley, Suengas, and Raye (1988) tested this hypothesis: In Study 1, 
participants were expected to remember either an autobiographical or an imagined event (e.g., 
recent fantasy, recent dream, unfulfilled intention) and rated the memories with respect to 39 
reality criteria using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire. Results showed that memories of 
autobiographical events were characterized by more sensory (e.g., visual detail, sound, smell, 
taste), contextual (e.g., location, time, year, season), and semantic information (e.g., events before, 
events after), whereas memories of imagined events contained more references to thought 
processes. These study results provided empirical evidence for reality monitoring of one’s own 
memories. 
In addition to the research group of Alonso-Quecuty and Hernández-Fernaud (e.g., Alonso-
Quecuty, 1992; Alonso-Quecuty, Hernández-Fernaud, & Campos, 1997; Hernández-Fernaud & 
Alonso-Quecuty, 1997), Sporer and Küpper (1995) explored whether the RM approach can also 
be used to assess the quality of someone else’s memory and to distinguish between truth and lies. 
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As true statements are based on real experiences and fabricated statements are internally 
generated, the logic of RM should also apply for detecting deceit. At this point it should be noted 
that lies could of course also contain experience-based elements and could therefore be only 
partially deceptive. Nevertheless, Sporer and Küpper (1995) developed a procedure to rate the 
RM criteria as verbal cues of credibility: the Judgement of Memory Characteristic Questionnaire, wherein 
they summarized a total of 35 items on the basis of factor-analytical results into eight RM scales 
(see Table 2). The scales include seven cues for experience-based and one cue for fabricated 
statements, namely cognitive operations during the event, which must be recoded to calculate the 
total score. Study results indicated that individual RM criteria are not only suitable for 
distinguishing between one’s own internally or externally generated memories, but are also 
effective in distinguishing experience-based and fabricated statements (for details see Sporer & 
Küpper, 1995). 
Table 2 
RM Criteria (Sporer & Küpper, 1995) 
1. Clarity of memory 
2. Sensory experiences  
3. Spatial information  
4. Time information  
5. Emotions and feelings 
6. Reconstructability of the story 
7. Realism of the story 
8. Cognitive operations 
There is no standardized set of RM criteria and so researchers use different versions (i.e., 
different criteria, different operationalizations of criteria). Moreover, to the best of our 
knowledge, in contrast to the CBCA, the RM approach is not used in practice (Vrij, 2015). Vrij 
(2008) also doubted that RM is capable of assessing the truth status of children’s statements or of 
statements that relate to events far back in time – two cases that are highly relevant in practice. 
Assessment of children’s statements would be a challenge because children have rich 
imaginations and hence imagined things resemble real memories. Assessment of memories from 
events far prior would be a challenge because people use cognitive operations to facilitate the 
retrieval of external memories of events far back in time, so the memories resemble internally 
generated memories.  
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF VERBAL TOOLS FOR CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT  
STUDY DESIGNS 
Basically, there are two approaches to investigate the validity of verbal tools for credibility 
assessment: Field studies using real-life statements (e.g., Roma, San Martini, Sabatello, Tatarelle, 
& Ferracuti, 2011) and laboratory studies using statements that are experimentally generated (e.g., 
Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2004a). Obviously, field studies on verbal tools for credibility 
assessment benefit from high ecological validity. The downside of real-life statements, however, 
is the difficulty to establish ground truth. Cases in which the credibility of a statement is at stake 
are generally characterized by a lack of objective evidence that can be used as validation criterion. 
Other criteria must therefore be used to determine the truth status of statements. For this 
purpose, studies use more or less hard criteria. Confessions to the police, for example, as used by 
Krahé and Kundrotas (1992), are certainly less objective than video recordings of an event filmed 
by the offender, as used by Akehurst, Manton, and Quandte (2011), but also harder to get. In 
addition, it should be noted that validation criteria might depend on the quality of statements. A 
perpetrator might only confess if the evidence against him or her is strong – if, for example, a 
victim provides a high-quality statement. Conversely, an innocent person could also make a false 
confession under the pressure of a false testimony. Due to the possible dependence of the 
statement quality and the validation criterion, Vrij (2005) assumed that the empirical evidence for 
field studies is inflated.  
On the other hand, the experimental control of ground truth in laboratory studies is at the cost of 
decreased ecological validity. Laboratory studies investigate experience-based and fabricated 
statements that are produced under conditions that are more or less comparable to the field of 
practical application. For example, participants experience an event that they are later instructed 
to truthfully report, or receive a description of an event that they should claim to have 
experienced (e.g., Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull, 2004b). In other studies, participants have 
been tasked with reporting autobiographical experiences that were either actually experienced or 
invented (e.g., Santtila, Roppola, Runtti, & Niemi, 2000). In these studies, ground truth is of 
course not guaranteed, since these statements cannot be verified. Santtila et al. (2000) addressed 
this problem by asking parents of study participants to validate the information.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR CBCA 
Thus far, the validity of the CBCA has mainly been investigated in the laboratory and only rarly 
in the field. Hence, empirical evidence is largely based on experimentally produced statements 
and lacks reference to contexts of practical application. In addition, the validity of external 
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validation criteria used in field studies is often criticized as not being independent of CBCA 
ratings (Vrij, 2008). These limitations need to be taken into account when evaluating the 
empirical evidence.  
Results of individual studies, which differ with regard to their study design (e.g., type of lie, age of 
participants, role of participants), are summarized in two reviews (Vrij, 2005, 2008) and two 
recent meta-analyses (Amado, Arce, & Fariña, 2015; Amado, Arce, Fariña, & Vilariño, 2016). Vrij 
(2005, 2008) included all research on CBCA published in English. In summary, studies largely 
provided support for CBCA, showing the CBCA criteria occurred more often in experience-
based than in fabricated statements. In cases where the Undeutsch hypothesis was not confirmed, 
studies typically showed no stastically significant difference between experience-based and 
fabricated statements. Only in very few cases the opposite was true, with CBCA criteria 
appearing more frequently in fabricated than in experience-based statements. Most of these 
contrasting findings occurred in two studies by Landry and Brigham (1992) and Ruby and 
Brigham (1998), which had methodical limitations that could be responsible for these results: 
First, the raters received only 45 minutes of training and, second, the collected statements were 
very short. With short statements, there is less opportunity for criteria to occur. With regard to 
the total score, Vrij (2008) outlined that 80% of the CBCA studies showed higher scores for 
experience-based than for fabricated statements. In only one of 20 studies, fabricated statements 
had higher total scores than experience-based statements. This study also had the same 
methodical limitations as described above (Ruby & Brigham, 1998). In addition, for 19 studies 
the classification rate was calculated. On average, in 71%, experience-based and fabricated 
statements were correctly classified (Vrij, 2008). The results of a meta-analysis on the validity of 
the CBCA in children samples by Amado and colleagues (2015) confirmed these findings and 
revealed significant positive effect sizes for each criterion (δ = 0.17-1.40) and the total score (δ = 
0.79). Within laboratory studies, 65% of experience-based statements met more criteria than 
fabricated statements; within field studies it was even 97%, whereby, however, the limited validity 
of the external criteria must be considered. In a second meta-analysis, Amado et al. (2016) 
investigated the validity of the CBCA in adult samples and, again, found significant positive effect 
sizes for almost all criteria (δ = 0.11-0.71; exceptions: self-deprecation, pardoning the perpetrator) and 
the total score (δ = 0.56). Moreover, Vrij (2005) reported good interrater reliabilities for most 
criteria (exceptions: unstructured production, spontaneous corrections) and excellent interrater reliabilities 
for the total score. 
In summary, previous research indicates that the empirical evidence for the validity of the CBCA 
is consistent across different study designs and populations. Especially, when compared to non-
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verbal indicators of deception (e.g., gaze, smile), which often show erratic patterns, i.e., occur 
both in true and deceptive responding (Vrij, 2008). Based on these findings, Vrij (2008) and 
Amado et al. (2015) concluded that the CBCA is largely compatible with the Daubert standards, 
the guidelines of the United States Supreme Court for admitting scientific evidence in court. 
Accordingly, on the basis of existing CBCA research, the following five questions can be 
confirmed: Is the scientific hypothesis testable? Has the hypothesis been tested? Is there a known 
error rate? Has the hypothesis and/or technique been subjected to peer review and publication? 
Has research supported the hypothesis and/or technique? However, the final requirement of the 
Daubert standards that the theory on which the hypothesis and/or technique is based has to be 
generally accepted in the appropriate scientific community is not fully met. Thus, the CBCA is 
repeatedly criticized as atheoretical: For example, Sporer (1997) stated that it is unclear which 
psychological processes are responsible for quality differences in statements and under which 
conditions they occur.  
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR RM 
As for the CBCA, most studies investigating RM were conducted in the laboratory and only a few 
in the field. In addition, external validation criteria of field studies were, again, often not 
independent of the assessment of statement quality. These limitations must be considered when 
interpreting empirical evidence for RM. 
Masip, Sporer, Garrido, and Herrero (2005) and Vrij (2008) summarized study results on RM. 
Both reviews found a mixed pattern at criteria level: Although some criteria were more 
pronounced in experience-based than in fabricated statements, they were not diagnostic in all 
studies (for example, clarity, visual details, sound details, temporal information, realism, and 
reconstructability; Vrij, 2008). For other criteria, there was an erratic pattern such that they were 
sometimes more strongly expressed in experience-based and sometimes more strongly expressed 
in fabricated statements (for example, sensory information, contextual embedding, affect, and cognitive 
operations; Vrij, 2008). These inconsistencies could be explained by different operationalizations of 
the criteria or different study procedures. For example, Vrij (2008) reported that one study found 
contradicting results for the criterion spatial information. This finding could be traced back to a 
methodical peculiarity of the study: Bond and Lee (2005) used an automatic computerized coding 
system and no human rater to assess RM criteria. Of course, these erratic findings could also 
indicate that some criteria do not work. The pattern looked clearer at the level of the total score: 
Multivariate analyses showed that the total set of RM criteria significantly discriminated between 
experience-based and fabricated statements. Only one study found no differences (Vrij et al., 
2004a). This study, however, examined statements from 5- to 6-year-old children, for whom 
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differentiation using the RM approach should be more difficult. In both reviews, classification 
rates were comparable to the CBCA, the average accuracy scores ranging from 65% to 85% 
(Masip et al., 2005) and from 63% to 82% (Vrij, 2008). Interrater reliabilities were also 
comparable to the CBCA and in a satisfactory range (see Sporer, 2004). However, RM coding is 
often described as being easier because there are fewer criteria and less room for interpretation. 
For example, raters experience fewer difficulties in distinguishing spatial and temporal details (RM 
criteria) than unusual, superfluous, and unexpected details (CBCA criteria).  
Although study results are partly contradictory at criteria level, previous research indicates that 
the RM total score discriminates between experience-based and fabricated statements across 
different study designs and populations. As for the CBCA, the Daubert standards are met with 
one exception. Thus, again, the following five questions can be affirmed: Is the scientific 
hypothesis testable? Has the hypothesis been tested? Is there a known error rate? Has the 
hypothesis and/or technique been subjected to peer review and publication? Has research 
supported the hypothesis and/or technique? However, Nahari (2018) pointed out that RM 
neglects an important characteristic of lying: the intention to deceive. As memory source 
monitoring approach, RM refers to internally generated false memories, but not to “self-
manipulated memories”. Thus, RM should not be able to fully explain differences between 
experience-based and fabricated statements.  
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META-ANALYSIS 1 
The aim of Meta-Analysis 12 was to estimate the effectiveness of verbal tools for credibility 
assessment in distinguishing between experience-based and fabricated statements on a meta-
analytic level. There is a large amount of data that examines the performance of CBCA and RM 
in different settings and indicates that both procedures work to a certain extent. Through 
synthesis, a meta-analysis enables both testing of whether these effects are robust across different 
populations and study designs, as well as the estimation of effect sizes more precisely than on the 
basis of individual studies alone (Borenstein et al., 2009). In comparison with a recent meta-
analysis by Amado and colleagues (2015) that focused exclusively on the effectiveness of the 
CBCA within Anglo-American samples of children, we extended our meta-analysis to both 
CBCA and RM within Anglo-American and German samples of children and adults. In addition, 
we tested whether further boundary conditions influence the performance of verbal tools for 
credibility assessment and took several moderators into account. Hence, we sought to answer the 
following research question: How well do verbal tools for credibility assessment work? What are 
optimal boundary conditions? What should be considered for future research? 
MODERATORS 
CHARACTERISTICS OF PARTICIPANTS 
AGE 
Under the assumption that lying requires executive control, it must also be proposed that the 
ability to lie, like executive control, varies over the life span. The relationship of age and executive 
control is characterized by an inverted U-curve (Craik & Bialystok, 2006). Debey, Schryver, 
Logan, Suchotzki, and Verschuere (2015) showed that parameters of the Sheffield Lie Test were 
also associated with age (partly in a U-shape): Lying accuracy increased with age during 
childhood, was highest in young adulthood, and decreased in the elderly. Although lying speed 
did not significantly change from young childhood to young adulthood, it also declined during 
adulthood. In addition, research showed that verbal indicators of truth are also age-dependent. 
Studies have repeatedly demonstrated that CBCA scores increase with age because the 
production of criteria depends on verbal, cognitive, and meta-cognitive abilities (e.g., Blandon-
Gitlin, Pezdek, Rogers, & Brodie, 2005; Buck, Warren, Betman, & Brigham, 2002; Roma et al., 
                                                 
2 Meta-Analysis 1 was published as Oberlader, V. A., Naefgen, C., Koppehele-Gossel, J., Quinten, L., Banse, R., & 
Schmidt, A. F. (2016). Validity of Content-Based Techniques to Distinguish True and Fabricated Statement: A Meta-
Analysis. Law and Human Behavior, 40, 440-457. doi: 10.1037/lhb0000193. For this reason, I refer to “we” when 
reporting on Meta-Analysis 1. 
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2011; Vrij et al., 2004a). With regard to RM, Vrij (2008) doubted that this approach is capable of 
assessing the truth status of children’s statements because children have rich imaginations and 
hence their imagined memories resemble real ones. These data suggest studying participants’ age 
as a moderator. 
SEX 
To the best of our knowledge, previous studies on verbal tools for credibility assessment revealed 
no statistically significant differences for statement quality of female and male participants (e.g., 
Roma et al., 2011; Sporer, 1997). However, since it is repeatedly discussed whether women and 
men differ in verbal abilities (e.g., meta-analysis by Hyde & Linn, 1988 revealed a small effect size 
of d = 0.33 indicating superior female performance in speech production), we investigated the 
influence of participants’ sex.  
MOTIVATION TO REPORT  
In addition to demographic characteristics of participants, it can be supposed that the motivation 
to provide an experience-based or fabricated statement influences its quality. Within field studies, 
a high level of motivation can be expected to lead to a detailed and convincing statement, since 
there is usually a lot at stake (e.g., conviction, arrest). It is, however, difficult to establish such 
high motivation in the laboratory. To address this problem, numerous studies have offered 
incentives to motivate both truth tellers and liars to report compelling stories (e.g., Gödert et al., 
2005; Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher, 2012; Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher, 2007). 
EXPERIENCE STATUS 
As described above, the CBCA was originally developed to assess the statement quality of alleged 
victims of child sexual abuse. However, many authors assume that the CBCA can also be used in 
other cases. Within laboratory studies researchers have investigated not only witnesses or victims 
(e.g., Vrij, Kneller, & Mann, 2000), but also suspects (e.g., Nahari et al., 2012). Moreover, studies 
differ in whether participants actively experienced an event (e.g., being part of a mock crime; Vrij 
et al., 2007) or only passively observed it (e.g., watching a video of a crime; Vrij, Edward, & Bull, 
2001). According to theories on episodic memory, real behavior should lead to more intense 
memory than imagining an event (Schacter et al., 2007) and thus influence the performance of 
verbal tools for credibility assessment. 
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TRAINING OF PARTICIPANTS 
It can be assumed that the performance of verbal tools for credibility assessment decreases when 
participants know the underlying rational, i.e., know which criteria indicate an experience-based 
or fabricated statement. Some studies have investigated the influence of training participants in 
the criteria used by credibility assessments. For example, a study by Vrij et al. (2000) showed that 
a CBCA expert could correctly classify only 27% of the statements if participants were trained. If 
participants were naïve, it was 69%. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE STATEMENT 
EVENT CHARACTERISTICS 
As already mentioned, it is difficult to design ecologically valid laboratory studies. How can an 
ethically acceptable situation be created that is comparable, for example, to the experience of 
sexual abuse? To depict real situations in the best possible way, Steller (1989) recommended 
creating events that are characterized by personal involvement, a negative emotional tone, and a 
certain loss of control. Some studies meet these requirements by asking participants to remember 
or fabricate an event that caused financial, emotional, and/or physical harm (e.g., Merckelbach, 
2004). 
PRODUCTION MODE 
Criteria rating of verbal tools for credibility assessment is usually based on oral statements (e.g., 
Akehurst, Köhnken, & Höfer, 2001). However, some studies have examined written statements 
(e.g., Nahari et al., 2012). Against this background arises the question of whether the production 
mode influences the quality of the statement. Horowitz and Newman (1964) showed that 
speaking is more productive and elaborate than writing, meaning that participants produced more 
words, phrases, and sentences in oral statements. Kellogg (2007) suggested that writing places 
higher demands on working memory than speaking, as it is less practiced, and demonstrated that 
participants’ reports on a recalled story were more complete and accurate when made orally. 
Based on these findings, Hauch et al. (2015) assumed that differences between liars and truth 
tellers should be more pronounced in written than in verbal reports, since liars should use 
comparatively less sensory and contextual details (RM criteria). In fact, their meta-analysis revealed 
that lies contained fewer sensory details than true stories only when written down by hand (gu = 
0.34) and contained fewer spatial details only when typed on a keyboard (gu = 0.13). However, for 
other indicators of deception, results were less clear (for details see Hauch et al., 2015).  
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TYPE OF LIE 
There are several types of lies that can be distinguished in different ways. An important 
distinction is whether a lie is completely fabricated (outright lie; e.g., Blandon-Gitlin, Pezdek, 
Rogers, & Brodie, 2005) or partly based on the truth (concealment lie; e.g., Bensi, Gambetti, 
Nori, & Giusberti, 2009). As concealment lies include experience-based aspects, it should be 
more difficult to distinguish them from true statements than outright lies. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ASSESSMENT PROCEDURE 
TYPE OF RATER 
The application of verbal tools for credibility assessment requires expertise in coding the criteria. 
In some studies statements have been rated by professionals (e.g., Vrij et al., 2007), and in others 
by trained laypersons (e.g., Merckelbach, 2004) or persons who are not familiar with the methods 
(e.g., Nahari et al., 2012).  
NUMBER OF CBCA CRITERIA AND SCORING OF CRITERIA 
In addition, studies differ in the selection of criteria. Regarding the CBCA, not all studies apply 
the full set of 19 criteria. Some study designs are simply not suited to produce certain CBCA 
criteria, thus they were omitted from the outset (e.g., Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij, 2014). For 
example, it is not possible to pardon a perpetrator if there was none. Other studies have used the 
14-item version of the CBCA by Raskin, Esplin, and Horowitz (1991), which excludes 
motivational criteria (e.g., Lamb et al., 1997). Furthermore, studies differ in the scoring of criteria: 
Either the criteria are measured using a Likert scale (e.g., Bradford, 2006) or only dichotomously 
in the form of absence/presence (e.g., Craig, Scheibe, Raskin, Kircher, & Dodd, 1999). 
TYPE OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES 
Studies have used different dependent variables to examine the effectiveness of verbal tools for 
credibility assessment. In some studies, raters have classified statements as true or deceptive (e.g., 
Berger, 2005). Other studies have used a statistical approach and determined classification rates 
using discriminant analysis (e.g., Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016). Since this approach 
optimizes the classification of statements by building and testing a model on the same sample, it 
must be cross-validated. Studies that have used discriminant analysis differ in whether they 
address this issue or not. Finally, some studies have compared means of verbal tools for 
credibility assessment in experience-based and fabricated statements (e.g., Bensi et al., 2009).   
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GENERAL STUDY CHARACTERISTICS 
STUDY DESIGN 
Previous reviews and meta-analyses on verbal tools for credibility assessment found larger effects 
for field than for laboratory studies (Amado et al., 2015; Vrij, 2005). This could be explained by 
the higher ecological validity of field studies, but also by the fact that validation criteria are not 
always independent of the quality of statements. Moreover, laboratory studies differ in whether 
participants were required to make both a experience-based and a fabricated statement (within-
subjects design; e.g., Elntib, Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft, 2014) or were only part of one experimental 
group (between-subjects design; e.g., Flieger, 2009). 
PUBLICATION STATUS 
In order to investigate publication bias, it was also examined whether effect sizes of unpublished 
and published studies differ. Furthermore, the year of publication was taken into account.  
METHOD 
DATABASE 
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
We included unpublished and published English- and German-language studies that compared 
the quality of experience-based and fabricated statements using CBCA or RM. Studies that 
compared true and suggestive statements were excluded. Just like lies, suggested statements are 
not experience-based and are internally generated, but – and that is a major difference – they are 
not created intentionally. Suggested memories, whether auto- or externally suggested, are based 
on the subjective belief that the remembered event has actually taken place (e.g., Loftus & 
Pickrell, 1995; Volbert & Steller, 2014). The rationale of verbal tools for credibility assessment, 
which is based on the fact that lying is cognitively demanding and involves motivational aspects 
like strategic self-presentation, is not appropriate in this case. This applies at least to the CBCA. 
Although minimal, there is empirical evidence that RM can distinguish between experience-based 
and suggested statements. A study by Schooler, Gerhard, and Loftus (1986) showed that RM-
trained raters outperformed untrained raters in classifying suggested statements. Nevertheless, we 
excluded laboratory studies on this subject.  
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KEYWORD SEARCH 
We ran the keyword search in the following databases: PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, and 
PSYNDEXplus Literature and Audiovisual Media. For English-language studies we used the 
following terms: “Criteria-Based Content Analysis”, “CBCA”, “Reality Monitoring”, “RM”, 
“Scientific Content Analysis”, “SCAN”, “Statement Validity Assessment”, “SVA”, OR “Validity 
Checklist”; AND “psychology of evidence”, “statement analysis”, “credibility”, “credibility 
assessment”, OR “deception”. For German-language studies we used following keywords: 
“Kriterienbasierte Inhaltsanalyse”, “CBCA”, “Reality Monitoring”, “RM”, “Scientific Content 
Analysis”, “SCAN”, “Statement Validity Assessment”, “SVA”, OR “Validity Checklist”; AND 
“Aussagepsychologie”, “Aussagebeurteilung”, “Glaubhaftigkeit”, OR “Glaubwürdigkeit”. We did 
not translate some of the keywords into German, as the respective English technical terms have 
been established in the German literature. The keyword search in the databases was completed 
on March 18, 2015. In addition, we have contacted researchers on verbal credibility assessment 
and asked for their unpublished studies. 
FINAL DATA SAMPLE 
From a total of 186 identified studies, 52 matched the inclusion criteria3 (see Figure 1). In some 
studies, several comparisons were calculated based on one sample of experience-based and 
fabricated statements. To avoid the problem of dependent data in these cases, we applied the 
following decision rule: If studies investigated different verbal tools for credibility assessment, 
namely CBCA and RM, in one data set, we included only results for the CBCA to estimate the 
overall meta-analytic effect size and to run moderator analyses. In addition, we computed 
separate effect sizes for both procedures, each including all comparisons of one technique, to 
enhance statistical power. All other single-case decisions can be found in the data table (column: 
description of effect size basis; see Appendix A).  
                                                 
3 Studies that examined SCAN were excluded due to the small number of studies (k = 3). 
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Figure 1. Full PRISMA diagram of the literature search of Meta-Analysis 1. 
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MODERATOR VARIABLES  
Moderator variables were either continuous or categorical. The following continuous moderators 
were examined: sex ratio of participants in terms of a proportion from 0 (all men) to 1 (all 
women), and year of publication. Categorical moderators are displayed in Table 3.  
Table 3 
Categorical Moderators 
Moderator Coding 
Age of participants < 18 years or ≥ 18 years 
Motivating incentive Absence or presence of financial or other 
motivating incentives 
Experience status Event personally experienced or event not 
personally experienced; accused or not accused 
Participant training Trained or not trained 
Event characteristics Absence or presence of personal involvement, 
negative emotional tone, and extensive loss of 
control 
Type of lie Concealment lie or outright lie 
Statement mode Oral or written 
Type of rater Laypersons, trained raters, or professionals 
Set of CBCA criteria Not complete, complete set of 19 CBCA criteria 
by Steller & Köhnken (1989), or 14-item version 
by Raskin et al. (1991) 
Scoring of criteria Absence/presence scoring or scoring on a Likert 
scale 
Decision basis Rater decision, discriminant analysis, or mean 
comparison 
Cross-validation in studies using discriminant 
analysis  
Cross-validation or no cross-validation 
Study design Field study or laboratory study; within-subjects 
design or between-subjects design 
Publication status Published or not published 
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CODING PROCEDURE AND INTERCODER RELIABILITY  
Two independent coders (first and third author of Oberlader et al., 2016) calculated effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d, Hedges’ g), standard errors, variances, and inverse variance weights. Based on a 
coding manual (see Appendix B), all moderator variables were rated. Intraclass correlation 
coefficients (two-way mixed, single measure) for continuous variables ranged from .80 to 1.00 
and Cohen’s kappa for categorical variables ranged from .74 to 1.00. Cases of disagreement were 
discussed after computing the interrater reliability and a consent decision was made.  
STATISTICAL ANALYSES  
EFFECT SIZE MEASURE 
As a measure of effect size, we used Cohen’s d = (Mtrue - Mfabricated) / SDpooled)
4. If studies provided 
means and standard deviations for CBCA or RM scores of experience-based and fabricated 
statements, Cohen’s d could be calculated directly on this basis. For studies that classified 
statements using statistical or rater decisions, results first had to be probit-transformed (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2000). Probit-transformed hit rates of correctly classified experience-based statements 
and probit-transformed false alarm rates of incorrectly classified fabricated statements were used 
to calculate Cohen’s d. Since Cohen’s d overestimates the effect size for small samples, we 
additionally calculated Hedges’ g = d * (1 - 3 / (4 * [ntrue + nfabricated] - 9). For the estimation of 
meta-analytical effects, effect sizes of the individual studies were weighted by their inverse 
variance weight (Lipsey & Wilson, 2000), w = (2 * ntrue * nfabricated * [ntrue + nfabricated]) / (2 * [ntrue + 
nfabricated] + ntrue * nfabricated * g). 
META-ANALYTICAL MODELS 
We used random-effects meta-analysis (REMA) for effect size estimation. The REMA, modeled 
as θi = μ + ui, addresses variation across studies and assumes that true effects have a mean of µ, 
and ui is a random error that is normally distributed around zero with a variance of τ². For 
moderator analyses, we ran random-effects meta-regressions, θ = ß0 + ß1xi1 + ui, with xi as 
moderator variable in study i and the residual variance ui that is normally distributed around zero 
                                                 
4 For within-subjects comparisons, effect sizes could be also calculated as Cohen’s drm = ([Mtrue – Mfabricated] / √ 
[SDtrue² + SDfabricated² – 2 x r x SDtrue x SDfabricated]) x √ (2 [1 – r]) (Lakens, 2013). The formula takes the correlation 
between measures of dependent groups into account. As this was not regularly provided in the included studies, we 
ran simulation analyses for all within-subjects comparisons with varying correlation coefficients (r = 0.1, r = 0.25, r = 
0.5, r = 0.75, r = 0.9). Results showed that effect sizes of within-subjects comparisons calculated as Cohen’s drm with 
varying correlation coefficients are virtually identical to each other and to effect sizes calculated as Cohen’s d = (Mtrue 
– Mfabricated) / SDpooled, differing only at the third decimal. Therefore, effect sizes of within-study comparisons were 
calculated as Cohen’s d. 
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with a variance of τ². To illustrate the practical significance of the effect size estimates, we 
additionally calculated the common language effect size indicator (CLES; McGraw & Wong, 
1992) where applicable. The CLES indicates the probability of cases where experience-based 
statements have higher scores than fabricated statements. Since the CLES requires the ns of the 
experience-based and fabricated statements and these were not available for the effect size 
estimation based on trim-and-fill, the CLES could only be calculated for REMA.  
In addition to effect size estimates, we provide information on the 95% CI, the z-statistic, the 
number of independent studies (k), and, where possible, the total number of statements (n). 
Moreover, we report the Q-statistic of moderation tests and I2 as measure of heterogeneity, which 
indicates the percentage of observed variance that reflects real differences between studies. 
According to Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, and Altman (2003), I2 values of 25% could be 
considered as low, 50% as medium, and 75% as high.  
TEST FOR OUTLIERS 
To test for outliers, we computed two additional REMAs for the overall effect, one without the 
lowest and one without the highest effect size. If the Q-statistic of heterogeneity of one or both 
of these data sets was statistically significant and changed over 50%, the study with the lowest 
and/or highest effect size would have been excluded as an outlier (Babchishin, Nunes, & 
Hermann, 2013).  
TEST OF PUBLICATION BIAS 
To test for publication bias, we used the trim-and-fill method by Duval and Tweedie (2000a) that 
is based on the graphical display of the effect sizes plotted against the standard error in a funnel 
plot. It is supposed that this funnel plot is asymmetrical if publication bias is present, i.e., more 
studies are on the side of positive effects. In this case, the trim-and-fill estimator iteratively 
removes individual study effects from one side of the funnel plot until the funnel plot is 
symmetrical (we used the estimators L0 and R0; Duval & Tweedie, 2000b). A corrected effect size 
is then calculated on the reduced data set. The previously removed studies are now refilled and 
further studies that are reflected at the recalculated mean are added. 
SOFTWARE 
To calculate the interrater reliabilities, we used IBM SPSS Statistics 24. For the meta-analytical 
calculations, we used the following R packages in R Statistical Software (version 3.4.1; R Core 
Team, 2017): compute.es (AC Del Re, 2013) and metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010). 
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RESULTS 
OVERALL EFFECT SIZE ESTIMATION 
A REMA on the total data set of 52 studies (Nstatements = 3,892) revealed a large point estimate 
with moderate to large effect sizes in the confidence interval and high heterogeneity between 
studies, d = 1.00 (95% CI [0.75, 1.25], z = 7.94, p < .001, I² = 92.12%) and g = 0.98 (95% CI 
[0.74, 1.22], z = 7.99, p < .001, I² = 91.72%). In 76%, experience-based statements had 
descriptively higher scores than fabricated statements. No study was excluded as statistical outlier.  
PUBLICATION BIAS 
The two trim-and-fill estimators yielded different results: The L0 estimator indicated that no 
studies needed to be filled in. The R0 estimator showed 12 missing studies. A REMA on the R0-
supplemented data set of 64 studies revealed a moderate point estimate for the bias-corrected 
effect size with small to large effects in the confidence interval and high heterogeneity, d = 0.58 
(95% CI [0.27, 0.89], z = 3.63, p < .001, I² = 95.60%).  
EFFECT SIZE ESTIMATION PER PROCEDURE 
Figure 2 displays the forest plot of the effect sizes. Point estimates ranged from -0.25 to 3.66. 
Three point estimates were negative, i.e., in contrast to the hypothesis, but not statistically 
significantly different from zero; 17 confidence intervals included negative effect sizes. 
CBCA 
A REMA showed that the CBCA discriminated statistically significantly between experience-
based and fabricated statements with a large point estimate and moderate to large effects in the 
confidence interval and high heterogeneity, d = 0.96 (95% CI [0.69, 1.24], z = 6.96, p < .001, I2 = 
91.76%) and g = 0.94 (95% CI [0.68, 1.21], z = 6.98, p < .001, I² = 91.36%), k = 44, Nstatements = 
3,070. In approximately 75% of the cases, experience-based statements had descriptively higher 
scores than fabricated statements. 
RM 
A REMA showed that the RM discriminated statistically significantly between experience-based 
and fabricated statements with a large point estimate and moderate to large effects in the 
confidence interval and high heterogeneity, d = 0.87 (95% CI [0.61, 1.13], z = 6.67, p < .001, I2 = 
85.19%) and g = 0.86 (95% CI [0.61, 1.11], z = 6.73 p < .001, I² = 84.57%), k = 17, Nstatements = 
1,892. In 73%, experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores than fabricated 
statements. 
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Figure 2. Forest plot separate for CBCA and RM including subset effect sizes and overall effect size 
estimation based on REMA. 
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MODERATOR ANALYSES 
Table 4 displays the results of categorial moderator analyses. Despite the subsets participants 
training: yes and type of rater: laypersons, all moderator subsets showed statistically significant positive 
effect sizes. Although moderator analyses were intended to explain true variance between studies, 
the heterogeneity within the subsets was still high. With two exceptions (subset discriminant analysis 
with bias correction; subset event not personally experienced), the I2 statistic revealed scores ≥ 81.85%.  
The Q-tests of moderation revealed two statistically significant results. First, it showed that the 
complete version of CBCA criteria outperformed any incomplete set. There was a large point 
estimate for studies using 19 CBCA criteria compared to a moderate point estimate for studies 
using incomplete sets. Studies using the 14-item version of the CBCA by Raskin et al. (1991) did 
not differ statistically significantly from the other moderator subsets. Second, moderator analyses 
showed that studies classifying experience-based and fabricated statements by discriminant 
analysis outperformed studies comparing means of CBCA/RM scores in experience-based and 
fabricated statements. There was a large point estimate for studies using discriminant analysis 
compared to a moderate point estimate for studies using mean comparisons. Studies classifying 
experience-based and fabricated statements by rater decisions did not differ statistically 
significantly from the other moderator subsets.  
All other categorical moderations were statistically non-significant. Only one of these results 
should be mentioned here, as it is a focal moderator closely related to the issue of publication 
bias: Effect sizes for published and unpublished studies yielded no statistically significant 
difference. Moreover, continuous moderators, the year of publication, Q(1) = 0.59, p = .442, k = 
52, as well as the sex ratio in the sample, Q(1) = 1.36, p = .244, k = 41, were statistically non-
significant. 
 
  
Table 4 
Results of categorical moderator analyses 
Moderator 
Moderator 
category 
g 95% CI 
Q 
I² in % k n Study IDs 
z 
Age of participants    0.49     
< 18 0.90 [0.39, 1.41] 3.47*** 91.76 11 767 7, 14, 15, 18, 19, 28, 29, 33, 42, 45, 51 
≥ 18 1.01 [0.73, 1.39] 6.29*** 92.23 35 1,796 1–6, 8–11, 13, 16, 20–22, 24–27, 30–32, 
34, 37, 39–41, 43, 44, 46–50, 52 
Motivating 
incentive 
   1.48     
No 0.93 
 
[0.65, 1.20] 
 
6.69*** 
 
89.95 
 
35 
 
1,962 
 
2, 4–12,14, 17, 22–27, 29, 31–34, 39, 40, 
42, 44–52  
Yes 0.67 [0.21, 1.13] 2.83*** 91.65 10 851 1, 16, 21, 28, 35–38, 41, 43 
Experience status     2.22     
Event not 
personally 
experienced 
1.01 [0.65, 1.36] 5.50*** 61.46  6 300 5, 9, 17, 31, 46, 48 
Event 
personally 
experienced 
0.88 [0.61, 1.15] 6.41*** 92.12 40 2,563 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 10–12, 14, 16, 20–29, 32–45, 
47, 49, 50–52 
    0.32     
Not accused  0.85 [0.62, 1.09] 7.09*** 89.76 41 2,532 2, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22–29, 31–33, 35–
42, 44–46, 48–52 
Accused 1.26 [0.15, 2.37] 2.22* 95.16  5 331 1, 21, 34, 43, 47 
Participant training    0.48     
No 0.92 [0.67, 1.17] 7.14*** 90.68 39 2,400 1, 2, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20–29, 31–36, 39, 
42–45, 47–49, 51 
Yes 0.75 [-0.10, 1.60] 1.74 92.71  6 380 37, 38, 40, 41, 46, 52 
         
  
Table 4 (continued) 
Moderator 
Moderator 
category 
g 95% CI 
Q 
I² in % k n Study IDs 
z 
Event 
characteristics 
(negative tone, 
personal 
involvement, loss 
of control) 
   0.06     
At least one 
missing 
0.87 
 
[0.64, 1.10] 
 
7.41*** 
 
88.58 
 
36 
 
2,535 
 
1, 2, 5, 7–10, 12, 14, 20–29, 31, 33–36, 
38–40, 42–44, 46–52 
All three 
present 
0.96 [0.22, 1.70] 2.53* 93.70 10 328 4, 6, 11, 16, 17, 28, 32, 37, 41, 45 
Type of lie    3.61     
Concealment  1.19 [0.40, 1.97] 2.95** 92.47  6 345 2, 31, 34, 35, 47, 48 
Outright  0.84 [0.58, 1.10] 6.31*** 91.12 38 2,418 1, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22–24, 26–29, 32, 
33, 36–46, 49–52 
Statement mode    0.18     
Oral  0.99 [0.75, 1.25] 7.75*** 90.19 44 2,525 1–5, 7–9, 11–21, 25–33, 35–46, 48–51 
Written 0.90 [0.13, 1.67] 2.29* 96.42  8 673 6, 10, 22–24, 34, 47, 52 
Type of rater     2.07     
Laypersons 0.72 [-0.02, 1.47] 1.91 91.84  6 437 6, 20, 22, 24, 34, 42 
Trained 
participants 
0.80 [0.59, 1.02] 7.29*** 83.14 31 2,023 2, 4, 5, 8–13, 15, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 
31–33, 35, 36, 38–40, 43–46, 48, 51, 52 
Professionals 1.25 [0.59, 1.90] 3.74*** 93.99 12 616 1, 3, 7, 16–18, 29, 30, 37, 41, 49, 50 
Set of CBCA 
criteria 
   6.51*     
Incomplete 
sets 
0.66 [0.43, 0.88] 5.73*** 81.85 27 1,730 1, 4–7, 9, 10, 11–14, 16, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, 
35, 36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 52  
19 CBCA 
criteria 
1.49 [0.77, 2.21] 4.05*** 92.36 12 422 3, 17, 20, 22, 30, 32, 33, 37, 40, 41, 44, 45 
14-item 
version 
1.20 [0.47, 1.93] 3.24** 92.67  5 412 15, 18, 29, 31, 48 
         
  
Table 4 (continued) 
Moderator 
Moderator 
category 
g 95% CI 
Q 
I² in % k n Study IDs 
z 
Scoring criteria    1.07     
Absence/ 
presence 
1.26 [0.67, 1.85] 4.20*** 92.63 14 770 7, 9, 11, 15, 18–20, 30, 31, 46, 47, 49–51 
Scoring on a 
scale  
0.88 [0.61, 1.16] 6.37*** 91.29 35 2,283 1–6, 8, 10, 12–14, 16, 17, 21–24, 26, 28, 
29, 32, 33, 35–45, 48, 52 
Decision basis 
 
 
 
 
   19.09***     
Discriminant 
function  
1.51 
 
[1.09, 1.93] 
 
7.10*** 
 
90.57 
 
20 
 
920 
 
2–5, 9, 12–14, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32–34, 
39, 41, 47, 51 
Rater decision 1.32 [0.57, 2.08] 3.42*** 86.58  7 260 8, 11, 17, 20, 30, 40, 45 
Mean 
comparison 
0.51 
 
[0.28, 0.74] 
 
4.66*** 
 
85.52 
 
25 
 
2,018 
 
1, 6, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 28, 
31, 35–38, 42–44, 46, 48–50, 52 
   0.02     
DF without 
cross-
validation  
1.67 [1.19, 2.16] 6.75*** 92.28 19 829 3, 4, 9, 12–14, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32–
34, 39, 41, 47, 51 
DF with cross-
validation 
 1.06 [0.67, 1.44] 5.39*** 0  2 119 2, 5 
         
         
         
         
         
         
  
Table 4 (continued) 
Moderator 
Moderator 
category 
g 95% CI 
Q 
I² in % k n Study IDs 
z 
Study designs    3.76     
Field studies 1.66 [0.73, 2.59] 3.51*** 90.17 6 335 3, 13, 15, 18, 19, 30 
Laboratory 
studies 
0.89 [0.66, 1.12] 7.44*** 90.71 46 2,863 1, 2, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20–29, 31–52 
    1.02     
 Within-
subjects 
0.81 [0.42, 1.19] 4.12*** 92.00 18 866 4, 6, 8, 10, 16, 17, 23, 27–29, 31, 32, 37, 
41, 44, 52 
 Between-
subjects 
1.08 [0.77, 1.38] 6.87*** 91.25 34 2,332 1–3, 5, 7, 9, 12–15, 18–22, 24–26, 30, 33–
36, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45–51 
Publication    2.57     
 Unpublished  1.45 [0.68, 2.21] 3.71*** 89.16  9 234 16, 17, 20, 22, 25, 32, 37, 40, 41 
 Published  0.89 
 
[0.65, 1.13] 
 
7.25*** 
 
91.00 
 
43 
 
2,964 
 
1–15, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26–31, 33–36, 38, 
39, 42–52  
       Note. DF = discriminant function. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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DISCUSSION 
HOW WELL DO VERBAL TOOLS FOR CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT WORK? 
Meta-analysis 1 found strong evidence that verbal tools for credibility assessment do work: The 
overall effect size estimation revealed a large point estimate with moderate to large effect sizes in 
the confidence interval. Further analyses showed that this finding applied for both CBCA and 
RM. The CLES indicated that in 76% or 73% of the cases experience-based statements had 
descriptively higher CBCA or RM scores than fabricated statements. Although these results are 
still far from a 100% hit rate, the application of verbal tools for credibility assessment is way 
better than any unstandardized judgment that hardly exceeds chance (e.g., Bond & De Paulo, 
2006). On a closer look, however, it appears difficult to determine their exact performance.  
First, the overall effect size decreased to a moderate point estimate with small to large effects in 
the confidence interval after controlling for publication bias using the R0 estimator of the trim-
and-fill method. Although, the L0 estimator provided no indication of publication bias and we 
included unpublished studies that, in addition, did not differ from published studies, we must at 
least consider that there are further unpublished studies that would weaken the present effect size 
estimation. Yet, as laid out above, the symmetry logic of trim-and-fill is based on the assumption 
that study results that are unpublished deviate strongly from the point estimate in the negative 
direction. In the present research context, a negative study effect would mean that the application 
of a verbal tool for credibility assessment has led to an erroneous assessment of the truth status: 
For example, the application of the CBCA criteria would have indicated an experience-based 
statement, whereas the statement would actually have been a lie or vice versa. Criteria of verbal 
tools for credibility assessment, at least of CBCA and RM, are, however, based on the 
theoretically founded and empirically confirmed assumption that true and deceptive responses 
are cognitively differently demanding. It seems therefore rather unlikely that unpublished studies 
would show exclusively negative effects and that verbal tools for credibility assessment would 
mistakenly point in the exact opposite direction. Nevertheless, as recommended by the Duval 
and Tweedie (2000a), the result of the R0 estimator should be interpreted as a lower threshold.  
Second, I2 statistics indicated high heterogeneity between studies that reduced statistical power of 
effect size estimation and its interpretability (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2009). 
The amount of true variance between studies, which was reflected in a wide confidence interval, 
could neither be explained by separate analyses of the procedures nor by moderator analyses. 
Hence, the question arises whether the included studies are actually a sample of one population. 
Although all studies compared experience-based and fabricated statements using CBCA or RM, 
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they might have tapped into different psychological processes of truth telling or lying. Even 
though we found only two statistically significant moderators, individual studies differed in many 
respects for providing experience-based and fabricated statements. Some of these factors may 
not have become statistically significant due to the low statistical power in moderator subsets, 
and others may not have been identified. However, as stated at the outset, it is the paradigm that 
determines the psychological processes that a measure, here CBCA or RM criteria, reflects. 
Hence, it cannot be ruled out that the study designs addressed different underlying mechanisms 
of true or deceptive responding (e.g., response inhibition when concealing a mock crime or 
construction of a fabricated autobiographic event) or at least addressed them to varying degrees. 
With regard to practical application, a wide range of study settings is certainly useful, since verbal 
tools for credibility assessment must work under different conditions. Yet, in order to investigate 
their validity, it is important to first take a step back and to be clear about which paradigm 
addresses which processes and whether these processes are actually related to truth telling or 
lying. If these questions are specified, various study designs can be implemented to accommodate 
different conditions in the field. However, in the current state of research, the interpretability of 
meta-analytical data is limited by the high degree of heterogeneity. In terms of these data, the 
answer to the first research question of how well verbal tools work for credibility assessment is 
not conclusive: It ranges from better than chance with a moderate bias-corrected point estimate 
to at best accurate in about 75% of the cases. 
WHAT ARE OPTIMAL BOUNDARY CONDITIONS? 
NUMBER OF CBCA CRITERIA 
Regarding the second research question on optimal boundary conditions, moderator analyses 
showed that the complete version of 19 CBCA criteria exceeded any incomplete set. The use of 
incomplete sets is usually explained by the fact that individual criteria could not occur in certain 
study designs (e.g., pardoning the perpetrator if no perpetrator exists). In such cases, the ecological 
validity is of course limited and could have contributed to smaller effect sizes. Moreover, with 
regard to classical test theory, longer tests have better validity, at least under certain psychometric 
boundary conditions. Effect sizes of studies using the 14-item version by Raskin and colleagues 
(1991), which leaves out motivational criteria, did not differ statistically significantly from effect 
sizes of studies using the complete or any incomplete set. However, the lack of statistically 
significant differences could be explained by the low statistical power in this subset, which 
contained only five studies.  
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DECISION BASIS 
Furthermore, moderator analyses revealed that studies comparing CBCA/RM scores of 
experience-based and fabricated statements found smaller effects than studies classifying 
statements via statistical decisions. Studies that compare mean scores use verbal tools for 
credibility assessment as a checklist. Each criterion is either evaluated as present or absent or 
rated on a Likert scale and the number of points is summed up. Even if some of these studies 
measure the intensity of the criteria, individual criteria are all equally considered. However, if 
statements are classified based on a statistical decision, individual criteria are weighted by their 
diagnostic value. Discriminant analysis only considers criteria that differentiate between 
experience-based and fabricated statements and weight them according to their effect sizes. Such 
criteria weighting needs to be cross-validated as it is modeled and tested on the same data set. 
Only two of the 21 studies using discriminant analysis carried out cross-validation. Moderator 
analyses showed no statistically significant difference between studies that carried out cross-
validation and those that did not, which could have been due to the low statistical power of the 
very small subset of studies performing cross-validation (k = 2). It is therefore highly likely that 
the effect size calculated from studies using classifications by discriminant analysis without cross-
validation is overestimated. Kleinberg, Arnzt, and Verschuere (2019) demonstrated that even if 
verbal cues and truth status are not correlated, discriminant analyses could lead to accuracy rates 
of up to 84% when used without cross-validation. The authors simulated different levels of 
correlation between verbal cues and the binary outcome truth or lie (r = 0.00, r = 0.10, or r = 
0.124) and calculated average accuracy rates for a different number of CBCA criteria (8, 12, or 
19) and different sample sizes (n = 40–1,000, in steps of 10) with or without cross-validation. For 
sample sizes below 320, as typically given in this research context (average sample size in Meta-
Analysis 1: Nstatements = 68), the use of models that were not cross-validated resulted in 
overestimates of 12% on average (range 6–29%) in independent test sets. However, when cross-
validated models were applied to independent test sets, accuracy rate deviations were not greater 
than 5%, even for small samples. In view of these findings, cross-validation, model testing on 
independent data sets, and larger samples are essential for future studies using discriminant 
analysis if meaningful results are to be achieved. 
FURTHER MODERATORS 
Further moderator analyses (i.e., on publication status, year of publication, participants’ age, 
motivation, experience status, role in the interview, and training status, as well as on the type of 
lie, statement mode, experience of raters, and scoring of criteria) yielded no statistically significant 
results. For some of these variables, this might be due to low-powered (small) subsets and 
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heterogeneous moderator categories. Regarding the type of lie, for example, we only 
distinguished between outright and concealment lies. We did not distinguish whether people had 
experienced an event in the context of a laboratory experiment, whether they made use of 
autobiographical memories, or both. A clear distinction was either not described or not possible 
in all studies. Therefore, we cannot rule out that there are factors, other than those found in the 
present meta-analysis, that influence the validity of verbal tools for credibility assessment. 
Particularly with regard to the Validity Checklist, the fourth stage of the SVA, it must be assumed 
that there are several personal and situational factors that need to be taken into account when 
assessing the content quality of statements.  
WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE RESEARCH? 
STANDARDIZATION OF PROCEDURES 
The examination of studies on verbal tools for credibility assessment has shown that future 
research should work on the standardization of CBCA and RM. The coding of criteria leaves 
room of interpretation. This applies in particular for CBCA criteria: When does something count 
as a detail and when is a detail unusual, when superfluous, and when unexpected? There have been 
attempts to specify coding decisions (e.g., Arntzen, 2011; Greuel et al., 1998), but criteria ratings 
are still subject to individual operationalization. For example, Arnzten (2011) defined descriptions of 
interactions as a sequence of actions and reactions. However, this definition leaves further 
questions unanswered: How many actions and reactions does it take to identify a sequence and 
code the criterion as present? Are all types of sequences equally meaningful, independent of 
content and context? Future studies should define coding rules a priori and describe them in 
detail. This is the only way to examine the validity of different operationalization. Although there 
is less room of interpretation for RM criteria, it is important to standardize the criteria set. 
Currently, there are different versions that contain different (numbers of) criteria. This 
complicates the interpretation of their validity, especially in light of partially contradictory 
findings (see EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR RM).  
BOUNDARY CONDITIONS 
Although we found only two statistically significant moderators, future research has to address 
factors that, in addition to the truth status, influence the quality of statements. The SVA takes 
such factors into account: The Validity Checklist comprises alternative hypotheses of whether a 
person could or would have made a particular statement if it were not experience-based. In the 
case of alleged child sexual abuse, CBCA criteria may be met if, for example, a child is familiar 
with the subject of sexual intercourse through consumption of pornographic material. Thus, the 
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quality of a statement could also be increased by observed events and not necessarily by a real 
experience.  
The Validity Checklist contains several other personal and situational factors that could influence 
the quality of a statement: for example, motives to report, the interview style, and the context of 
the original disclosure. However, it is neither standardized nor empirically validated. First, there 
are different versions including different alternative hypotheses (Raskin & Esplin, 1991; Steller, 
1989; Steller & Boychuk, 1992; Yuille, 1988) and second, there are no exact specifications on 
how the obtained information is integrated with the results of the CBCA. Consider the above 
example: What statement quality would be expected if a child had prior knowledge of sexual 
intercourse but no sexual abuse had taken place? Or the other way around: What statement 
quality is necessary to rule out that a statement was generated in a way other than based on 
experience? There are no standardized guidelines to answer these questions, the assessment is 
case-specific. Of course, it is difficult to impossible to determine norms for all potential factors 
that influence statement quality. However, it is necessary to expand research, which has so far 
been limited to very few aspects (e.g., age, interview style, coaching of the interviewee; see Vrij, 
2005). Particularly, with regard to RM it is important to investigate more closely whether this 
procedure also works with young children and when reported events occurred far back in time. 
Results of the present moderator analyses indicated that future studies should use discriminant 
analysis to investigate under which personal and situational conditions verbal tools for credibility 
assessment work (best). This way, it could be investigated which criteria differentiate between 
experience-based and fabricated statements if certain boundary conditions are present (e.g., prior 
knowledge/experiences, reporting motives, or interview style) and how these should be 
weighted. Contrary to previous practice, it is imperative that research using discriminant analysis 
cross-validate results on independent samples.  
ECOLOGICAL VALIDITY OF STUDY DESIGNS 
Furthermore, future research must focus on the ecological validity of studies. Even though 
moderator analyses showed no statistically significant differences between laboratory and field 
studies or between different characteristics of laboratory studies (motivation to report, event 
characteristics, interview role, or type of lie), ecologically valid operationalization is indispensable 
if study results are to be generalized to practical contexts. It is, of course, difficult to impossible 
to create real-life conditions in the laboratory that are comparable, for example, to the experience 
of sexual abuse. Nevertheless, it is still important to maximize cognitive demands and the 
motivation for reporting experience-based or fabricated statements, for instance, by gathering 
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statements orally in face-to-face situations, posing follow-up questions, repeating interviews, and 
verifying the claimed details to whatever extent possible.  
However, most laboratory studies lack precisely these conditions. In contrast, participants 
typically give only one free narrative – sometimes even in written form – and are not asked any 
follow-up questions. Moreover, laboratory studies often rely on (fabricated) autobiographical 
statements that cannot be verified. Besides cognitive demands, the motivation to make a 
deceptive statement in laboratory studies also differs greatly from real case scenarios. A false 
allegation in real life could have detrimental outcomes for others (e.g., imprisonment), whether 
desired or not, which cannot be compared with motivational conditions in experimental settings. 
In addition, laboratory as well as field studies usually simplify the concept of truth and lie as 
dichotomous although it is actually rather continuous. Liars often use episodic memories to 
invent an account and only modify individual details. In the original context for which CBCA 
criteria were developed, namely children’s statements on sexual abuse (Steller & Köhnken, 1989), 
this problem is less prevalent: Usually, children have no previous sexual experience and cannot 
recourse to episodic memory. However, in cases where previous experience (or vicarious 
knowledge from media depictions) cannot be ruled out, for example, if the issue of concern is 
not whether sexual intercourse took place but whether it was consensual, the use of episodic 
memories can no longer be excluded. Finally, in some laboratory designs cues that are not part of 
a procedure, but still confounded with the truth status, find their way into statements. For 
example, in experiments in which raters assess the credibility of a number of statements based on 
the same experimentally induced experience (e.g., Memon, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot, & 
Mastroberardino, 2010), they might infer that a specific detail mentioned by many participants 
(e.g., “then she brought up the blue bucket”) is highly likely to be associated with truth status. 
This is certainly a diagnostic cue that could not be determined in a single-case content-based 
assessment.  
These exemplary shortcomings illustrate that experimental scenarios deviate to a substantial 
degree from real-life conditions and thus limit the generalizability of the present meta-analytic 
results to practical contexts. In order to be able to answer the question of whether empirical 
results can be generalized, we urgently need studies that are internally and ecologically valid, 
make lying maximally difficult, and enhance motivation to provide a convincing statement. In 
addition, future field studies should use validation criteria that are largely independent of the 
quality of statements.   
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CONCLUSION 
With a large point estimate and moderate to large effects in the confidence interval, verbal tools 
for credibility assessment offer great potential to distinguish between experience-based and 
fabricated statements. This finding applied for both CBCA and RM, despite the fact that (1) 
there was a high level of heterogeneity between studies that could not be resolved by moderator 
analyses and, (2) it cannot be ruled out that effect size estimates are biased and thus verbal tools 
for credibility assessment only work to a smaller extent. In the end, however, the question of 
whether CBCA and RM work well enough to be the core part of expert witness testimonies is 
only partially an empirical one. Whether a piece of evidence is considered valid and how it is 
weighted is ultimately a legal decision that is for example guided by the Daubert standards, which 
are largely fulfilled in the present case (see EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE OF VERBAL TOOLS OF 
CREDIBILITY ASSESSMENT). For comparison, the identification of faces by eyewitnesses that 
demonstrated a comparable effect size of g = 0.82 (Meissner & Brigham, 2001) is widely accepted 
evidence in court. This does not, of course, justify the use of CBCA and RM, but might serve as 
a benchmark to interpret the present effect size estimates with regard to the practical 
applicability.  
Compared to other promising psychophysiological or behavioral measures of deception, verbal 
tools for credibility assessment show similar effect sizes (see for example meta-analyses by Leue 
& Beauducel, 2019, on P3; by Suchotzki et al., 2017, on different reaction time-based methods). 
Yet, they are easier to apply for the average psychological expert witness and do not require 
technical equipment. In addition, other measures of deception or, more precisely, other 
paradigms used to capture these measures have certain limitations concerning construct validity 
and/or application-specific boundary conditions.  
For example, the Concealed Information Test (Lykken, 1959) measures not lying, but crime-related 
knowledge. Participants are asked crime-related questions and are given one relevant (e.g., a crime 
characteristic) and several neutral response options, all of which they should deny. It is supposed 
that the relevant alternative is significant/salient only for people with crime knowledge and 
causes different physiological or behavioral responses compared to the neutral alternatives. In 
addition to limited construct validity with respect to lying, problems arise in the application: In 
order to carry out the Concealed Information Test, details of the incident must be known to the 
diagnostician and the guilty respondent. Moreover, critical and neutral items need to be 
indistinguishable from the perspective of the innocent respondent. Therefore, the procedure 
cannot be applied if it is in doubt whether an event has taken place at all, if critical details are not 
encoded or remembered by the guilty respondent, or if they have been leaked.  
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These remarks illustrate once again the importance of first specifying the psychological processes 
of truth telling and/or lying a paradigm addresses. This call applies to all paradigms, no matter 
what measure they use (e.g., event-related potentials, reaction time, verbal cues). In the next step, 
the validity of different measures should be investigated under ecologically valid conditions. 
Recent study results by Gibbons, Schnuerch, Wittinghofer, Armbrecht, and Stahl (2018) 
indicated that hereby a combination of reaction time-based measures and event-related potentials 
seems promising. The combination with other approaches may also enhance the performance of 
verbal tools for credibility assessment. Although there are several important appeals to future 
research, we can state for now that, at least in empirical research settings, CBCA and RM are 
among the best empirically validated methods for assessing the credibility of statements.   
 46 
INTERIM CONCLUSION 
Meta-Analysis 1 demonstrated that verbal tools for credibility assessment have great potential for 
distinguishing between experience-based and fabricated statements: A REMA revealed a large 
point estimate with moderate to large effect sizes in the confidence interval. Although the R0 
estimator of trim-and-fill pointed to a downward correction, we gave less weight to this finding 
since other data indicated no concern of publication bias (i.e., L0 estimator of trim-and-fill, 
moderator analysis on published and unpublished studies).  
However, the scientific and social debate on the so-called replication crisis (re)intensified awareness 
of quality problems in (psychological) research – and thus for the impact of publication bias. It 
has long been known that studies that report statistically significant findings are more likely to get 
published than studies that report statistically non-significant results (e.g., Sterling, 1959). 
Kühberger, Fritz, and Scherndl (2014) provided an exemplary illustration of this problem: In a 
random sample of 1,000 studies from 2007, they found three times as many statistically 
significant as non-significant results (see also Fanelli, 2011). This disproportion is inconsistent 
with the generally low statistical power in psychological research (Bakker, van Dijk, & Wicherts, 
2012). It is therefore conceivable that statistically non-significant study results are suppressed, 
either due the reluctance of researchers to publish such findings (Cooper, DeNeve, & Charlton, 
1997) or their being disregarded by reviewers (Mahoney, 1977) and editors (Coursol & Wagner, 
1986), or both. The Open Science movement, which emerged in response to replication crisis, has 
reemphasized the impact of publication bias and related problems with alarming data.  
For example, the Open Science Collaboration (2015) investigated the reproducibility of psychological 
research and tried to replicate results of 100 experimental and correlational studies published in 
three high-ranking journals. This mammoth project showed that, depending on the criterion, 
only 36% to 68% of the original results could be replicated. It is reasonable to assume that 
remaining studies applied questionable research practices (QRPs; John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012) 
and could therefore not be replicated. QRPs refer to researchers’ degrees of freedom to collect 
and analyze data in different ways (e.g., different criteria for excluding outliers, choosing the 
dependent variable that works best, optionally increasing the sample size if results are not 
significant yet) in order to achieve statistically significant results. These analysis strategies are not 
necessarily chosen intentionally (Gelman & Loken, 2014). Researchers might find the expected 
results within the first analysis and stop analyzing. However, if they had not found the effect, 
they would probably have carried out further analyses. Hence, even if research strategies are 
unintentional, they can still be arbitrary and motivated by the results (Silberzahn et. al., 2018; 
Simonsohn, Simmons, & Nelson, 2015). 
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These findings are highly relevant for the present research on the validity of verbal tools for 
credibility assessment. They demonstrated that data collecting, analyzing, reporting, and/or 
publishing strategies dramatically reduce the likelihood that statistically non-significant studies 
will be accessible and integrated into meta-analyses. Therefore, if QRPs and publication bias are 
present, statistically significant studies are overrepresented in meta-analyses and, consequently, 
effect sizes will be overestimated. Although Meta-Analysis 1 did not clearly indicate cause of 
concern regarding bias in data, the impact of bias should not be downplayed, but rather taken 
into account if it cannot be completely ruled out. However, a simulation study by Carter, 
Schönbrodt, Gervais, and Hilgard (2019) pointed out that REMA and trim-and-fill, the methods 
used in Meta-Analysis 1, are not suitable for that purpose: Both meta-analytic methods produced 
an unacceptably high number of false-positive results when publication bias was present (Carter 
et al., 2019). To take the problem of validity-threatening biases seriously, we re-analyzed previous 
data with other bias-correcting meta-analytical methods in Meta-Analysis 25.   
                                                 
5 Meta-Analysis 2 is under review at PLoS ONE as Oberlader, V. A., Quinten, L., Banse, R., Volbert, R., Schmidt, A. 
F., & Schönbrodt, F. D. (2019). How robust are meta-analytic findings on the validity of content-based credibility 
assessment? A comparison of six meta-analytic methods and recommendations for future research. Manuscript 
submitted for publication. For this reason I refer to “we” when reporting on Meta-Analysis 2. 
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META-ANALYSIS 2 
The principle aim of Meta-Analysis 2 was to test the robustness of the previous meta-analytic 
findings on the validity of verbal tools for credibility assessment using different bias-correcting 
meta-analytical methods in addition to REMA and trim-and-fill. Based on the results of their 
simulation study, Carter et al. (2019) recommended, first, to run an a priori method performance check 
in order to assess the performance of individual meta-analytic methods under expected 
conditions in the data set and, second, to carry out a sensitivity analysis, which weights the results 
of all meta-analytic methods according to step one. Within this two-step procedure, we expanded 
the database and examined a third verbal tool for credibility assessment, the Scientific Content 
Analysis (SCAN). We sought to answer the following research question: Are the findings of our 
previous meta-analysis robust? More specifically, are CBCA, RM, and SCAN valid procedures to 
assess statement credibility according to the present empirical literature? Finally, what are optimal 
boundary conditions as well as implications for future research?   
META-ANALYTIC METHODS 
The informative value of a meta-analysis is limited by the quality of the data basis. For example, a 
meta-analysis will yield biased effect size estimates if the included studies themselves contain 
biased effects. To address this problem, several meta-analytic methods correct for biases in data 
sets. There are a number of simulation studies investigating the performance of these methods 
(e.g., Hedges & Vevea, 1996; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014; Simonsohn, Nelson, & Simmons, 
2014; McShane, Böckenholt, & Hansen, 2016; Stanley, 2017). In short, results indicate that bias-
correcting meta-analytic methods fail under certain conditions. Yet, due to the fact that each 
study examines only a limited number of methods and simulates only a limited subset of 
conditions, the studies disagree on which method to recommend under which conditions.  
Against this background, Carter et al. (2019) conducted a comprehensive simulation study and 
investigated the performance of seven meta-analytic methods (REMA, trim-and-fill, PET-
PEESE, p-curve, p-uniform, 3PSM, and WAAP) under various conditions. They systematically 
varied the severity of publication bias (none, medium, or high) and QRPs (none, medium, or 
high). In addition, the authors simulated different effect sizes (d = 0, 0.2, 0.5, or 0.8), degrees of 
heterogeneity between studies (τ = 0, 0.2, or 0.4), and numbers of studies included in meta-
analyses (k = 10, 30, 60, or 100). This simulation study revealed that there is no single meta-
analytic method that uniformly outperforms other meta-analytic methods under all conditions. 
Which meta-analytic method performs best depends on the research environment.  
 49 
REMA 
The REMA approach assumes that the true effects of individual studies are distributed around an 
average true effect, whereas variance is assigned to both sampling error and true variance 
between studies. This way, researchers can meta-analyze studies that investigate one 
phenomenon, but vary in their underlying effect due to study characteristics. Since studies on the 
validity of verbal tools for credibility differ in many respects, for example with regard to event 
characteristics, type of lie, and population, a REMA is, in principle, suitable in the present 
research context. However, Carter et al. (2019) showed that it leads to almost 100% false-positive 
rates (i.e., incorrect rejection of a true null effect) and overestimation of the true effect size if 
publication bias is present. Accordingly, the authors advise against using REMA if publication 
bias cannot be ruled out. Although we included all unpublished studies that we knew of and that 
were accessible at that time in Meta-Analysis 1, we cannot rule out that there are further 
unpublished studies we have not been able to take into account. Therefore, we used the trim-
and-fill method to estimate the number of missing studies and to correct the effect size. 
However, trim-and-fill has its own limitations. 
TRIM-AND-FILL 
As described in Meta-Analysis 1, the trim-and-fill method is based on the graphical display of the 
effect sizes plotted against the standard error in a funnel plot (Duval & Tweedie, 2000a). 
Although the primary goal of trim-and-fill is to detect the presence of publication bias, it also 
provides an estimate of the true effect size and the number of missing studies. However, the 
symmetry logic is based on the notion that studies that were not published or disclosed deviate 
greatly from the mean value in the negative direction. However, as discussed in Meta-Analysis 1, 
it might be the case that the unpublished studies show null, and not negative effects. Moreover, 
the simulation study by Carter et al. (2019) demonstrated that the trim-and-fill method revealed 
almost 100% false-positive rates (i.e., incorrect rejection of a true null effect) as well as 
overestimation of the true effect size if publication bias was present. 
PET-PEESE 
The precision-effect test (PET; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014) is a meta-regression approach 
that corrects for the influence of small-study effects. This meta-analytic method makes use of the 
fact that significant effects that occur despite small sample sizes (e.g., as a result of QRPs) usually 
lead to negative correlations between effect size and sample size or, respectively, to positive 
correlations between effect size and standard error in the data set of meta-analyses. The PET 
method plots a regression line based on a weighted linear regression model, di = b0 + b1 sei + ei 
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with b0 as intercept and b1 as slope of the relation between the ith effect size estimate di and its 
standard error sei. The estimated intercept, where a theoretically infinitely large sample has a 
standard error of zero, displays the bias-corrected effect size. However, this adjustment can be an 
overcorrection, as small-sample effects do not necessarily result from QRPs or publication bias.  
The precision-effect estimate with standard error (PEESE; Stanley & Doucouliagos, 2014) is 
based on the same approach. Yet, in contrast to PET, PEESE calculates a quadratic regression 
line, as the influence of publication bias is assumed to be higher in low-precision studies with 
lower statistical power (i.e., small sample size, large standard error) than in high-precision studies 
with higher statistical power (i.e., large sample size, small standard error). Thus, the effect size is 
regressed on the squared standard error in a weighted least squares regression model, di = b0 + b1 
sei
2
 + ei with b0 as intercept and b1 as slope of the relation between the ith effect size estimate di and 
its squared standard error sei
2. 
Simulation studies showed that PET outperforms PEESE when the true effect is zero, since 
PEESE overestimates the size of null effects, and vice versa, PEESE outperforms PET when the 
true effect is non-zero, since PET underestimates the size of non-zero effects (Stanley & 
Doucouliagos, 2014). Based on these findings it has been recommended to combine both meta-
analytic methods into a conditional estimator called PET-PEESE: If the PET estimator produces 
a non-significant result, this estimator should be chosen. If the PET estimator produces a 
significant result, the PEESE estimator should be chosen. Carter et al. (2019) showed that false-
positive rates of PET-PEESE increased with smaller sample sizes, higher heterogeneity, and 
fewer biases. Moreover, with decreasing sample size as well as increasing biases and 
heterogeneity, PET-PEESE revealed underestimation of the true effect size.  
P-CURVE AND P-UNIFORM 
A p-curve is the distribution of all statistically significant p-values (p < .05) across a set of studies. 
The shape of a p-curve is a function of the statistical power of the included studies, which is in 
turn a function of the effect size and sample size. If there is a null effect, the p-curve is flat since 
the probability that a p-value falls within a certain interval is uniformly distributed, i.e., the same 
number of p-values is expected between .00 and .01 and, for example, between .04 and .05. 
However, if a true effect exists, the shape of the p-curve is right-skewed, as there are relatively 
more low p-values than high p-values. Hereby the following applies: The bigger the effect size, 
the more right-skewed the p-curve. If QRPs are present, i.e., if study results were pressed below 
the significance threshold of p = .05, the right-skewness decreases. The p-curve is therefore 
suitable to make inferences on the presence of QRPs and/or publication bias. Furthermore, it 
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can be used to test the absence of a true effect and to estimate the true effect size (Simonsohn et 
al., 2014). However, effect size estimation using the p-curve is only based on statistically 
significant studies, thus excluding null effects, and, moreover, not providing confidence intervals. 
Like the p-curve, p-uniform uses the distribution of p-values to test for publication bias, to test 
the absence of a true effect, and to estimate the effect size of statistically significant studies (p < 
.05). The same assumptions apply as for the p-curve. Technically, p-curve and p-uniform differ 
only in the algorithms used (McShane et al., 2016), however, p-uniform allows for computing 
confidence intervals. Carter et al. (2019) showed that with increasing heterogeneity both p-curve 
and p-uniform revealed increasing false-positive rates and overestimation of the true effect size.  
SELECTION METHODS 
The selection methods approach assesses and corrects for publication bias by modeling the 
conditions under which studies get published or not. Hedges (1984) introduced the first selection 
method, which included two models: A data model that assumes a fixed true effect size, and a 
selection model based on the assumption that only statistically significant studies get published. 
The specification of both models by selection methods allows assessment of the identifiability of 
model parameters and testing hypotheses for model parameters using maximum likelihood 
estimation. In addition, the extent of publication bias can be estimated and corrected. This 
rationale has been extended in other selection methods (Hedges & Vevea, 1996; Iyengar & 
Greenhouse, 1988). For example, Iyengar and Greenhouse (1988) based their selection method 
on the assumption that both statistically significant and statistically non-significant studies can get 
published. They integrated a weight function approach modeling the probability of statistically 
significant studies to get published (p-values < .025, one-tailed) compared to the probability of 
statistically non-significant studies to get published (.025 < p-values < 1, one-tailed). Since this 
method assumes homogeneous effect sizes, an extended version of this selection method 
considers three parameters (three-parameter selection method; 3PSM): an effect size parameter 
of the true average effect size, a weight parameter for the probability of publication for 
statistically significant and non-significant studies, and a parameter for the amount of 
heterogeneity between studies (McShane et al., 2016). Carter et al. (2019) showed that false-
positive rates of 3PSM increased with smaller sample sizes, higher heterogeneity, and less biases. 
Moreover, with decreasing sample size as well as increasing biases and heterogeneity, 3PSM 
revealed underestimation of the true effect size.  
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WAAP 
The weighted average of adequately powered studies (WAAP) is another method to reduce the 
influence of publication bias in meta-analyses (Stanley, Doucouliagos, & Ioannidis, 2017). WAAP 
only includes studies with a statistical power > 80%, i.e., studies that meet the standard of 
adequate power (Cohen, 1988) and are thus most informative. By excluding low-powered studies, 
WAAP is ideally less affected by potential biases. If no biases exist, the exclusion of low-powered 
studies means only a small loss of information and statistical power for meta-analytic effect size 
estimation. The standard error of each effect size estimate is compared to the division of the 
fixed-effects weighted average by 2.8. If the standard error is smaller than the quotient, a study 
has adequate power, as the true effect must differ at least 2.8 standard errors from zero when a 
5% level of statistical significance and a power of 80% are assumed (1.96 [standard normal value 
for a significance value of 5%] + 0.84 [standard normal value for a statistical power of 80%]). 
The single effect size estimates of adequately powered studies are weighted by 1/se2 (Stanley et al., 
2017). According to Carter et al. (2019), WAAP causes alarmingly high false-positive rates and 
overestimation of the true effect size when publication bias was present, although this effect was 
slightly reduced by higher heterogeneity and smaller sample sizes. 
Although all presented meta-analytic methods fail under certain conditions, Carter et al. (2019) 
recommended using all of them and weighting their results according to an a priori method 
performance check based on expected conditions in the data set. This way it is transparent how 
conclusions would change if the research environment changed. 
SCIENTIFIC CONTENT ANALYSIS 
Updating the data set from Meta-Analysis 1 with further studies, we were able to additionally 
meta-analyze validation studies on SCAN, a verbal tool for credibility assessment developed by 
Avinoam Sapir, a former polygraph examiner (http://www.lsiscan.com/intro_to_scan.htm). 
SCAN is based on the assumption that experience-based and fabricated statements differ in 
language and structure. There is no standardized list that defines the number and 
operationalization of SCAN criteria. In the research context, sets of 12 or 13 criteria are 
commonly used (e.g., Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach, 2016; Nahari et al., 2012; 
Vanderhallen, Jaspaert, & Vervaeke, 2015). According to reports from SCAN course participants, 
some SCAN criteria are more likely to occur in experience-based statements and others in lies. 
Based on the criteria list provided by Nahari et al. (2012; Table 5), it seems that most criteria 
could be used both ways, either as indicators of experience-based or fabricated statements (e.g., 
use of pronouns: “I left the house” indicates the truth, whereas “Left the house” indicates deceit; 
Nahari et al., 2012).  
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Table 5 
13 SCAN Criteria (Nahari et al., 2012) 
Indicator for truth or lie Criteria  
Lie indicator A change in terminology or vocabulary  
Lie indicator Emotions within the statement that are placed before the climax  
Lie indicator Omitting pronouns (e.g., “left the house” rather than “I left the house”) 
Lie indicator Lack of conviction and memory  
Truth indicator Denial of allegation 
Lie indicator Out of sequence information 
Lie indicator Ambiguous social introduction of involved persons (e.g., “we” instead of 
“me and my wife Lisa”) 
Lie indicator Spontaneous corrections (e.g., crossing out what has been written) 
Truth indicator Balanced structure of the statement (20% activities leading to the 
event, 50% actual event, 30% after the event) 
Truth indicator First-person singular past tense  
Truth indicator Correspondence of objective (actual duration of events) and subjective 
(amount of words used to describe these events) time 
Lie indicator Extraneous information  
Lie indicator Inclusion of words that indicate that some information is missing  
 
Some SCAN criteria resemble CBCA criteria (e.g., lack of conviction, spontaneous corrections). 
Strikingly, according to SCAN, these criteria indicate a lie (and thus, remarkably resemble 
erroneous lay beliefs of which CBCA criteria should not be included if individuals aim to deceive; 
Maier et al., 2018), whereas according to CBCA they indicate an experience-based statement. 
This difference may be explained by the fact that SCAN is not grounded on explicitly formulated 
theoretical assumptions or empirical findings, whereas CBCA is based on the Undeutsch 
hypothesis (Undeutsch, 1967) from which an empirically-informed theoretical framework has 
been derived (Steller & Köhnken, 1989; Volbert & Steller, 2014).  
So that the presence of SCAN criteria can be evaluated in a plain statement without interferences 
from an investigator, the suspect, witness, or alleged victim is asked to write down his/her 
version of what happened. Alternatively, the investigator can use the Verbal Inquiry - the Effective 
 54 
Witness (VIEW) questionnaire that will, according to Sapir, “practically solve the case by itself” 
(http://www.lsiscan.com/intro_to_scan.htm). Unfortunately, there is no description of how the 
VIEW questionnaire actually achieves this challenging task. Although SCAN has repeatedly been 
criticized for its lack of scientific foundation and weak empirical evidence, it is widely used (e.g., 
Nahari et al., 2012). Sapir’s homepage contains an impressively long list of SCAN course 
participants, ranging from the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the United States Department 
of Justice (http://www.lsiscan.com/id29.htm). 
METHODS 
DATABASE 
INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION CRITERIA 
We included unpublished and published English- and German-language studies that compared 
the quality of experience-based and fabricated statements using CBCA, RM, or SCAN. As in 
Meta-Analysis 1, we excluded laboratory studies that examined differences between experience-
based and suggested statements.  
KEYWORD SEARCH 
We ran the keyword search in the following databases: PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, and 
PSYNDEXplus Literature and Audiovisual Media. For English-language studies we used the 
following terms: “Criteria-Based Content Analysis”, “CBCA”, “Reality Monitoring”, “RM”, 
“Scientific Content Analysis”, “SCAN”, “Statement Validity Assessment”, “SVA”, OR “Validity 
Checklist”; AND “psychology of evidence”, “statement analysis”, “credibility”, “credibility 
assessment”, OR “deception”. For German-language studies we used following keywords: 
“Kriterienbasierte Inhaltsanalyse”, “CBCA”, “Reality Monitoring”, “RM”, “Scientific Content 
Analysis”, “SCAN”, “Statement Validity Assessment”, “SVA”, OR “Validity Checklist”; AND 
“Aussagepsychologie”, “Aussagebeurteilung”, “Glaubhaftigkeit”, OR “Glaubwürdigkeit”. We did 
not translate some of the keywords into German, as the respective English technical terms have 
been established in the German literature. The keyword search in the databases was completed 
on November 21, 2017. In addition, we have contacted researchers on verbal credibility 
assessment and asked for their unpublished studies.  
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Figure 3. Full PRISMA diagram of the literature search of Meta-Analysis 2. 
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FINAL DATA SET 
From a total of 192 identified studies, 71 matched the inclusion criteria (see Figure 3). We added 
19 studies (study IDs 53-71) that were not incorporated in our first meta-analysis because they 
either had been published after our database search had been completed (54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 68) 
and/or because they investigated SCAN (57, 58, 59, 71). We also included studies that we had 
not identified in our first search because they were unpublished (61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68) or had 
not been included in any database (53, 60, 62, 70). In some studies, several comparisons were 
calculated based on one sample of experience-based and fabricated statements. To avoid the 
problem of dependent data, we made the following decision: If studies applied different verbal 
tools for credibility assessment to one data set, we included only one procedure per study to 
estimate the overall meta-analytic effect size and to run moderator analyses. That is, if studies 
investigated CBCA as well as RM and/or SCAN, we only included the effect size from CBCA 
results. If studies investigated RM and SCAN, we only included the effect size from RM results. 
In addition, we computed separate effect sizes for each procedure, each including all 
comparisons of one technique, to enhance statistical power. All other single case decisions can be 
found in the data table (column: description of effect size basis; see Appendix A).  
MODERATOR VARIABLES 
Moderator variables were identical to Meta-Analysis 1. To avoid repition, please refer to Meta-
Analysis 1. 
CODING PROCEDURE AND INTERRATER RELIABILITY  
Two independent coders (first and second author of Oberlader et al., 2019) calculated effect sizes 
(Cohen’s d, Hedges’ g), standard errors, variances, inverse variance weights, t-values, and degrees 
of freedom. Based on a coding manual (see Appendix B), all moderator variables were rated. 
Intraclass correlation coefficients (two-way mixed, single measure) for continuous variables were 
1.00 for all variables. Cohen’s kappa for categorical variables ranged from .85 to 1.00. Cases of 
disagreement were discussed after computing the interrater reliability and a consent decision was 
made.  
STATISTICAL ANALYSES 
EFFECT SIZE MEASURE 
The calcuation of effect sizes was identical to Meta-Analysis 1. To avoid repition, please refer to 
Meta-Analysis 1. 
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META-ANALYTIC METHODS 
To investigate the robustness of the meta-analytical findings from Meta-Analysis 1, we used four 
bias-correcting meta-analytic methods in addition to REMA and trim-and-fill: PET-PEESE, p-
uniform, 3PSM, and WAAP. To compare the reanalyzed results to our previous meta-analysis, 
REMA was calculated on the basis of ds and gs. For all other meta-analytic methods, we used 
only Hedges’ g. Furthermore, we ran a p-curve analysis to test for publication bias and QRPs. For 
this purpose, we calculated the t-value for each study/effect size using the following formulas 
that we resolved to t: d = t √ (1/n1 + 1/n2) for between-subject designs and d = t / √ n for within-
subjects designs (Lakens, 2013). However, we did not use p-curve for effect size estimation as it 
differs from p-uniform only in the estimation algorithm, but does not provide confidence 
intervals. 
To illustrate the practical significance of the effect size estimates, we additionally calculated the 
CLES (McGraw & Wong, 1992) where applicable. Since the CLES requires the ns of the 
experience-based and fabricated statements and these were not available for the study subsets of 
some meta-analytic methods (trim-and-fill, p-uniform, and WAAP), CLES could only be 
calculated for REMA, PET-PEESE, and 3PSM. 
In addition to effect size estimates, we provide information on the 95% CI, the z-statistic, the 
number of independent studies (k), and, where possible, the total number of statements (n). 
Moreover, we report zm-statistic of moderation tests and τ as a measure of heterogeneity, which 
reflects the standard deviation of the distribution of true effect sizes under the assumption that 
true effect sizes are normally distributed. 
TEST FOR OUTLIERS 
The test of outliers was identical to Meta-Analysis 1. To avoid repition, please refer to Meta-
Analysis 1. 
METHOD PERFORMANCE CHECK 
Using the Meta-Showdown Explorer (http://shinyapps.org/apps/metaExplorer/), we 
investigated the performance of the candidate methods under plausible conditions of the present 
data. According to Carter et al. (2019) results derived using any given method should be treated 
with caution if the Meta-Showdown Explorer showed poor performance. On the other hand, if a 
meta-analytical method showed good performance in all plausible research environments, this 
strengthens confidence in the conclusions drawn from such a result.  
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To this end, specifications must be selected for five areas: a) severity of publication bias, b) 
amount of heterogeneity, c) number of studies in meta-analysis, d) true effect size under H1, and 
e) QRPs environment. Since we actively searched for unpublished studies by requesting 
researchers in the field of verbal credibility assessment share their unpublished work and were 
thus able to include a larger number of unpublished studies, we assumed no to medium severity 
of publication bias. From our first meta-analysis we know that there is a high degree of 
heterogeneity among studies, so we chose the highest value (τ = 0.40) from the available options. 
We included 71 studies in our meta-analysis. Thus, we selected the default options 60 and 100 for 
the number of studies. Our first meta-analysis resulted in an uncorrected estimate of d = 1.00 
[95% CI [0.75, 1.25]). Since this result could be biased by potential publication bias and QRPs, 
we conservatively assumed a medium (d = 0.50) to high (d = 0.80) true effect under H1. Since the 
dependent variable, i.e., the score of verbal tools for credibility assessment, can be calculated in 
different ways (e.g., rating of absence/presence vs. rating of quality, inclusion of all criteria vs. a 
selection of criteria), a medium environment for QRPs was assumed.  
After specifying the basic settings of the assumed research environment, criteria that define 
acceptable performance thresholds for a meta-analytical method must be chosen. We chose a 
maximum deviation of the average estimate from the true delta of 0.3 and a false-positive rate of 
≤ 5% as criteria for good performance. Based on this definition of good performance, the 
following performance characteristics were supposed: The performance of the REMA, PET-
PEESE, p-uniform, and WAAP was poor under the H0 and under the H1. Trim-and-fill 
performed well under the H0 and H1 if there was no publication bias. Notably, 3PSM was the 
only bias-correction method that performed well under H0 and H1 in all plausible conditions. 
Hence, in the case that meta-analytical methods lead to conflicting conclusions, we give the 
strongest weight to the 3PSM results. In addition, we used only this method for moderator and 
subset analyses. 
SOFTWARE 
To calculate the interrater reliabilities, we used IBM SPSS Statistics 24. For the meta-analytical 
calculations, we used the following R packages in R Statistical Software (version 3.4.1; R Core 
Team, 2017): compute.es (AC Del Re, 2013), metafor (Viechtbauer, 2010), META (Schwarzer, 
2007), p-uniform (van Aert, 2018), and weightr (Coburn & Vevea, 2017). In addition, we used the 
p-checker app (Schönbrodt, 2018) and the p-curve app 4.06 (http://www.p-curve.com/app4/) 
for p-curve analysis, and Meta-Showdown Explorer (http://shinyapps.org/apps/metaExplorer/) 
for the method performance check. 
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RESULTS 
OVERALL EFFECT SIZE ESTIMATION 
REMA 
Table 6 displays the overall effect size estimates for the different meta-analytic methods. A 
REMA on the updated set of 71 studies showed that verbal tools for credibility assessment 
discriminated statistically significantly between experience-based and fabricated statements with a 
large point estimate and moderate to large effects in the confidence interval and high 
heterogeneity between studies. In about 75% of the cases, experience-based statements had 
descriptively higher scores than fabricated statements. No study was excluded as a statistical 
outlier.  
Table 6 
Overall effect size estimates of the different meta-analytic methods 
Meta-analytic 
method ES [95% CI] 
Test 
statistic 
p τ k 
CLES 
(%) 
REMA  0.96a [0.77, 1.15] 9.68c < .001 0.76 71 75 
0.94b [0.75, 1.13] 9.71 c < .001 0.74 71 75 
Trim-and-fill 
(R0) 
0.60b [0.35, 0.84]  4.74c < .001 1.11 86  
PET-PEESE  -0.11b [-0.43, 0.22]  -0.65d .516  71 47 
p-uniform 1.04b [0.89, 1.20]  -8.51e < .001  48  
3PSM 0.90b [0.61, 1.19]  6.32c < .001 0.74 71 74 
WAAP 0.47b [0.32, 0.62]  0.07f < .001  24  
Note. Some values cannot be specified for all meta-analytic methods (cells are left empty). ES = effect size. 
aBased on Cohen’s d. bBased on Hedges’ g. cz-statistic. dt-statistic. eL.0 statistic. fWAAP test statistic. 
TRIM-AND-FILL 
The two trim-and-fill estimators yielded different results: The L0 estimator indicated that no 
studies needed to be filled in. The R0 estimator showed 15 missing studies. A REMA on the R0-
supplemented data set of 86 studies revealed a moderate point estimate for the bias-corrected 
effect size with small to large effects in the confidence interval and high heterogeneity between 
studies (Table 6).  
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PET-PEESE  
As the PET intercept did not differ statistically significantly from zero, PET is preferable over 
PEESE, which revealed a small significant bias-corrected effect size (g = 0.39, 95% [0.21, 0.56], p 
< .001). Thus, the PET-PEESE estimator indicated that verbal tools for credibility assessment 
did not distinguish statistically significantly between experience-based and fabricated statements: 
The probability that experience-based statements had a higher score than fabricated statements 
was descriptively below the level of chance at 47% (Table 6). The correlation between effect size 
and standard error was r = .49, p < .001 (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5. Scatterplot of effect size and standard error (r = .49, p < .001). 
P-UNIFORM 
Based on the statistically significant studies (ksig = 48), p-uniform revealed a large point estimate 
with large effects in the confidence interval (Table 6).  
3PSM 
According to the adjusted 3PSM model, verbal tools for credibility assessment discriminated 
statistically significantly between experience-based and fabricated statements with a large point 
estimate and moderate to large effects in the confidence interval and high heterogeneity between 
studies. In about 74%, experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores than 
fabricated statements (Table 6). There were 46 studies in the one-tailed p-values < .025 interval 
and 25 studies in the .025 < one-tailed p-values < 1 interval. 
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WAAP 
WAAP indicated that 24 studies had an adequate power > 80%. Hence, roughly a third of the 
updated data set could be used for effect size estimation that revealed a small point estimate and 
small to moderate effects in the confidence interval (Table 6).  
P-CURVE ANALYSIS 
The p-checker app showed a success rate of 74%. This means the rate of statistically significant 
studies was below the median observed power (87%). Accordingly, there was no inflation of 
statistically significant studies. Figure 6 shows the distribution of significant p-values (k = 50)6. 
The distribution was right-skewed, i.e., comparatively more studies fell into the range of low p-
values.  
 
Figure 6. Graphical display of the p-curve. The observed p-curve includes 50 statistically significant (p 
< .05) results, of which 45 are p < .025.   
                                                 
6 Due to different implementations in the computation of the p-value, two p-values were just significant in the p-
curve analysis (Study ID 10 p = .049; Study ID 55 p = .047), leading to 50 included studies, and not significant in the 
p-uniform analysis (Study ID 10 p = .078; Study ID 55 p = .027, one-tailed), leading to 48 included studies.  
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EFFECT SIZE ESTIMATION PER PROCEDURE  
Figure 4 displays the forest plot of the effect sizes, separate for CBCA, RM, and SCAN. Point 
estimates ranged from -0.25 to 3.66. Six point estimates were negative, i.e., in contrast to the 
hypothesis, but statistically not significantly different from zero; 28 confidence intervals included 
negative effect sizes.  
CBCA 
The adjusted 3PSM model revealed a large point estimate of gadjusted = 0.82 (95% CI [0.48, 1.17], z 
= 5.01, p < .001, τ = 0.75, k = 55, Nstatements = 3,008). There were 36 studies in the one-tailed p-
values < .025 interval and 19 studies in the .025 < one-tailed p-values < 1 interval. In about 73%, 
experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores than fabricated statements. 
RM 
The adjusted 3PSM model revealed a large point estimate of gadjusted = 0.73 (95% CI [0.39, 1.06], z 
= 4.54, p < .001, τ = 0.46, k = 23, Nstatements = 1,977). There were 18 studies in the one-tailed p-
values < .025 interval and five studies in the .025 < one-tailed p-values < 1 interval. In about 
70%, experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores than fabricated statements.  
SCAN 
The adjusted 3PSM model revealed a large but statistically non-significant point estimate of gadjusted 
= 1.40 (95% CI [-0.07, 2.87], z = 1.87, p = .062, τ = 0.46, k = 7, Nstatements = 404). In about 84%, 
experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores than fabricated statements. There 
were two studies in the one-tailed p-values < .025 interval and five studies in the .025 < one-
tailed p-values < 1 interval. With only two studies in the one-tailed p-value < .025 interval, results 
should be interpreted with caution.  
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Figure 4. Forest plot separate for CBCA, RM, and SCAN including subset effect sizes and overall 
effect size estimation based on 3PSM. 
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MODERATOR ANALYSES  
Table 7 displays the results of categorial moderator analyses with 3PSM. Despite the subsets a 
priori decision rule, discriminant analysis without cross-validation, and discriminant analysis with cross-
validation, all moderator subsets showed statistically significant positive effect sizes. Although the 
moderator analyses was intended to explain true variance between studies, the heterogeneity 
within the subsets was still high (τ ≥ 0.62). 
The zm-tests of moderation revealed three statistically significant results. First, moderator analyses 
with 3PSM showed statistically significantly larger effect sizes for field studies than for laboratory 
studies. In addition, effect size estimates based on mean differences between experience-based 
and fabricated statements were statistically significantly smaller than effect size estimates based 
on classifications by statistical or rater decisions. Studies that compared mean scores showed a 
moderate point estimate. Classifications based on statistical decisions or rater decisions revealed 
large effects. Studies that used a priori decision rules did not differ statistically significantly from 
the other moderator subsets. Finally, moderator analyses with 3PSM showed that the complete 
set of CBCA criteria outperformed any incomplete set. There was a large effect for studies using 
19 CBCA criteria compared to a moderate effect for studies using incomplete versions. Studies 
using the 14-item version of the CBCA by Raskin et al. (1991) did not differ statistically 
significantly from the other moderator subsets.  
All other categorical moderations were statistically non-significant. Only one of these results 
should be mentioned here, as it is a focal moderator closely related to the issue of publication 
bias: Effect sizes for published and unpublished studies yielded no statistically significant 
difference. Moreover, continuous moderators, the year of publication (z = 1.78, p = .074, k = 71) 
and the sex ratio in the sample (z = 0.76, p = .445, k = 53) were statistically non-significant. 
 
 
  
Table 7 
Results of moderator analyses with 3PSM 
Moderator 
Moderator 
categories 
g 95% CI 
zm 
τ k n Study IDs 
z 
Age of participants    0.41     
< 18 0.97 [0.52, 1.42] 4.24*** 
0.76 
17 1,238 7, 14, 15, 18, 19, 28, 29, 33, 42, 45, 51, 62–
65, 67, 68 
≥ 18 1.07 [0.73, 1.41] 6.13*** 44 2,881 1–6, 8–11, 13, 16, 20–22, 24–27, 30–32, 34, 
37, 39–41, 43, 44, 46–50, 52–58, 60, 61, 70 
Motivating 
incentive 
   0.67     
No 0.86 [0.58, 1.14] 6.00*** 
0.62 
48 3,431 2, 4–12, 14, 17, 22–27, 29, 31–34, 39, 40, 
42, 44–53, 56, 58, 60, 62–70 
Yes 0.71 [0.28, 1.14] 3.24** 13 1,171 1, 16, 21, 28, 35–38, 41, 43, 54, 55, 57 
Experience status     0.68     
Event not 
personally 
experienced 
1.01 [0.47, 1.55] 3.67*** 
0.63 
7    478 5, 9, 17, 31, 46, 48, 60 
Event 
personally 
experienced 
0.82 [0.55, 1.10] 5.91*** 56 4,194 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 10–12, 14, 16, 20–29, 32–45, 
47, 49–58, 61–70 
    1.07     
Not accused  0.81 [0.53, 1.09] 5.70*** 
0.63 
55 4,122 2, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22–29, 31–33, 35–
42, 44–46, 48–53, 55–58, 60, 62–69 
Accused 1.11 [0.57, 1.66] 3.99*** 7    530 1, 21, 34, 43, 47, 54, 70 
Participant training    0.95     
No 0.89 [0.62, 1.17] 6.44*** 
0.63 
55 4,097 1, 2, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20–29, 31–36, 39, 42–
45, 47–49, 51, 53–55, 57, 58, 60–70 
Yes 0.62 [0.04, 1.20] 2.09* 7    492 37, 38, 40, 41, 46, 52, 56 
         
  
Table 7 (continued) 
Moderator 
Moderator 
categories 
g 95% CI 
zm 
τ k n Study IDs 
z 
Event 
characteristics 
(negative tone, 
personal 
involvement, loss 
of control) 
   0.60     
At least one 
missing 
0.88 [0.60, 1.16] 6.13*** 
0.63 
47 3,644 1, 2, 5, 7–10, 12, 14, 20–27, 29, 31, 33–36, 
38–40, 42–44, 46–52, 54, 55, 60, 62–66, 68–
70 
All three met 0.75 [0.30, 1.19] 3.31** 14    928 4, 6, 11, 16, 17, 28, 32, 37, 41, 45, 53, 57, 
58, 67 
Type of lie    0.41     
Concealment  0.93 [0.48, 1.39] 4.01*** 
0.64 
12    781 2, 31, 34, 35, 47, 48, 54, 57, 60, 61, 67, 68 
Outright  0.84 [0.55, 1.12] 5.75*** 49 3,791 1, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20, 22–24, 26–29, 32, 
33, 36–46, 49–53, 55, 56, 58, 62–66, 69, 70 
Statement mode     0.39     
Oral  0.93 [0.62, 1.24] 5.88*** 
0.74 
57 3,776 1–5, 7–9, 11–21, 25–33, 35–46, 48–51, 54, 
55, 60–70 
Written 0.83 [0.32, 1.33] 3.22** 13 1,243 6, 10, 22–24, 34, 47, 52, 56–59, 71 
Type of rater     all zs ≤ 1.66     
Laypersons 0.65 [0.06, 1.23] 2.17* 
0.65 
 7    495 6, 20, 22, 24, 34, 42, 61 
Trained 
participants 
0.81 [0.51, 1.11]  5.26*** 42 3,182 2, 4, 5, 8–13, 15, 19, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28, 31–
33, 35, 36, 38–40, 43–46, 48, 51, 52, 55, 56, 
58, 60, 62–65, 68–70 
Professionals 1.16 [0.77, 1.56]  5.79*** 17 1,060 1, 3, 7, 16–18, 29, 30, 37, 41, 49, 50, 53, 54, 
57, 59, 66 
         
         
         
         
         
  
Table 7 (continued) 
Moderator 
Moderator 
categories 
g 95% CI 
zm 
τ k n Study IDs 
z 
Set of CBCA 
criteria 
 
  
1 < 2    2.58** 
   
 
all other 
zs 
≤ 1.41 
Incomplete 
sets1 
0.66 [0.31, 1.02] 3.69*** 
0.68 
37 2,519 1, 4–7, 9–14, 16, 19, 21, 25, 26, 28, 35, 36, 
38, 39, 42, 43, 46, 49, 50, 52, 60–68, 70 
19 CBCA 
criteria2 
1.33 [0.85, 1.81] 5.45*** 13    585 3, 17, 20, 22, 30, 32, 33, 37, 40, 41, 44, 45, 
69 
14-item 
version  
1.17 [0.50, 1.83] 3.44**  5    552 15, 18, 29, 31, 48 
Scoring criteria    1.24     
Absence/ 
presence 
1.22 [0.78, 1.66] 5.97*** 
0.74 
17 1,046 7, 9, 11, 15, 18–20, 30, 31, 46, 47, 49–51, 
53, 54, 57 
Scoring on a 
scale  
0.93 [0.61, 1.26] 5.68*** 48 3,612 1–6, 8, 10, 12–14, 16, 17, 21–24, 26, 28, 29, 
32, 33, 35–45, 48, 52, 55, 56, 58, 60–66, 68, 
70, 71 
Decision basis   
  
1 > 3     3.84*** 
   
 
2 > 3     2.85** 
all other 
zs 
≤ 1.17 
 Discriminant 
function1 
1.31 [0.99, 1.63] 8.06*** 
0.63 
24 1,683 2–5, 9, 12–14, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 32–34, 39, 
41, 47, 51, 58, 66, 67, 70 
Rater 
decision2 
1.34 [0.83, 1.84] 5.21*** 10    402 
8, 11, 17, 20, 30, 40, 45, 59, 64, 65 
Mean 
comparison3 
0.56 [0.25, 0.88] 3.54*** 35 2,942 1, 6, 7, 10, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 24, 25, 28, 31, 
35–38, 42–44, 46, 48–50, 52–56, 60–63, 68, 
69 
 A priori rule 0.73 [-0.21, 1.68] 1.52  2      34 57, 71 
         
  
Note. DF = discriminant function. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
 
Table 7 (continued) 
Moderator 
Moderator 
categories 
g 95% CI 
zm 
τ k n Study IDs 
z 
Decision basis DF without 
cross-
validation 
0.73 [-0.51, 1.97] 1.16 
1.21 
22 1,508 3, 4, 9, 12–14, 21, 23, 26, 27, 29, 30, 32–34, 
39, 41, 47, 51, 58, 66, 70 
DF with cross-
validation 
-0.07 [-2.53, 2.51] 0.05  2    119 2, 5 
Study design    3.08**     
Field studies 1.76 [1.20, 2.33] 6.11*** 
0.67 
 8    389 3, 13, 15, 18, 19, 30, 59, 71 
Laboratory 
studies 
0.84 [0.56, 1.11] 5.97*** 63 4,672 1, 2, 4–12, 14, 16, 17, 20–29, 31–58, 60–70 
   1.54     
Within-
subjects 
0.73 [0.34, 1.11] 3.67*** 
0.72 
23 2,020 4, 6, 8, 10, 11, 16, 17, 23, 27–29, 31, 32, 37, 
39, 41, 44, 52, 53, 58, 60, 61, 67 
Between-
subjects 
1.03 [0.73, 1.34] 6.63*** 48 3,041 1–3, 5, 7, 9, 12–15, 18–22, 24–26, 30, 33–
36, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45–51, 54–57, 59, 62–66, 
68–71 
Publication status    1.28     
 Unpublished  1.16 [0.71, 1.61] 5.08*** 
0.72 
16    698 16, 17, 20, 22, 25, 32, 37, 40, 41, 61, 63–67, 
69 
 Published 0.87 [0.57, 1.17] 5.70*** 55 4,363 1–15, 18, 19, 21, 23, 24, 26–31, 33, 34, 35, 
36, 38, 39, 42–60, 62, 68, 70, 71 
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DISCUSSION 
The informative value of a meta-analysis is limited by the quality of the underlying data. If a study 
set is biased, meta-analytic estimations of the true effect will be biased, too, unless the method is 
robust against biases. Within a comprehensive simulation study Carter et al. (2019) investigated 
the performance of different meta-analytic methods under varying conditions. Since results 
demonstrated that both methods used in Meta-Analysis 1, REMA and trim-and-fill, performed 
poorly when publication bias was present, we reanalyzed our data with further bias-correcting 
meta-analytic methods in an updated data set. A priori, we performed a method performance 
check to weight the results of individual methods according to their suitability for the present 
data set. So, what does the evidence tell us? Can we still claim that verbal tools for credibility 
assessment are valid procedures to distinguish between experience-based and fabricated 
statements? In short, this question can be affirmed. However, this affirmation needs to be 
qualified by the specific meta-analytic method, boundary conditions, and the examined 
procedures.  
HOW ROBUST ARE META-ANALYTIC FINDINGS ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT META-ANALYTIC 
METHODS?  
REMA 
In line with our previous findings based on 52 studies, a REMA on the expanded data set of 71 
studies revealed a large point estimate with moderate to large effects in the confidence interval. In 
other words, in 75% of the cases experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores 
than fabricated statements. However, according to the method performance check these results 
are only to be trusted if biases in the data set can be ruled out. Although the results of p-curve 
and moderator analyses gave no indication of publication bias, it is not entirely possible to 
exclude its presence. Therefore, on the basis of REMA no conclusion on the validity of verbal 
tools for credibility assessment is possible. 
TRIM-AND-FILL 
According to the R0 estimator of trim-and-fill, verbal tools for credibility assessment distinguish 
between experience-based and fabricated statements with a moderate point estimate and small to 
large effects in the confidence interval. However, as discussed in Meta-Analysis 1, it seems rather 
unlikely that unpublished studies would show exclusively negative effects and that verbal tools 
for credibility assessment would mistakenly point in the exact opposite direction. Moreover, 
based on the method performance check, trim-and-fill would only be suitable if there were no 
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publication bias. Again, since we cannot entirely exclude publication bias, the informative value 
of the trim-and-fill estimate is limited. 
PET-PEESE 
The bias-correcting meta-regression approach PET-PEESE showed a null effect corroborating 
that verbal tools for credibility assessment cannot discriminate between experience-based and 
fabricated statements. Effect size and standard error were positively correlated (see Figure 5), i.e., 
studies with larger effect size estimates had less statistical power to actually find these effects. 
This relationship could result from QRPs, i.e., from (non-)intentional analysis strategies that 
incorrectly pushed p-values below the significance threshold of p < .05. However, there might be 
other reasons for this correlation. For example, studies with larger effects might have been of 
higher quality than studies with smaller effects. A higher quality study design might dovetail a 
more laborious (recruitment) procedure and, therefore, ultimately result in attenuated sample 
sizes. We coded the quality of the studies according to various criteria. For example: Was it an 
ecologically valid field study or a laboratory study? Were the users of the procedures experts? 
Was the event characterized by negative tone, personal involvement, and a certain loss of 
control? However, graphical inspection of scatterplots of effect size and standard error within 
moderator subsets demonstrated that none of these quality criteria provided an explanation for 
the positive correlation between both statistics: Even in subsets indicating a high study quality, 
positive associations occurred7. Since study designs differed in many aspects, it is conceivable that 
further quality differences exist. Apart from that, according to the method performance check, 
PET-PEESE performance was poor under all selected conditions. Consequently, the conclusion 
of a null effect, i.e., the possibility that verbal tools for credibility assessment cannot distinguish 
between experience-based and fabricated statements, should be viewed with skepticism. 
P-UNIFORM 
Based on the results of p-uniform it can be assumed that verbal tools for credibility assessment 
are able to discriminate between experience-based and fabricated statements to a large extent. 
However, this method only includes statistically significant studies. In our view, however, a meta-
analysis needs to consider all performed studies. Otherwise, the estimate is upward biased. In 
addition, the method performance check showed that p-uniform performed poorly under all 
selected conditions. Hence, this estimate is of limited value. 
                                                 
7 With regard to the small subsets of the moderator categories, correlation coefficients were not calculated. 
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WAAP 
According to WAAP, it can be assumed that verbal tools for credibility assessment distinguish 
between experience-based and fabricated statements with a moderate point estimate and small to 
moderate effect sizes in the confidence interval. However, WAAP performance was poor under 
all conditions of the method performance check. Its interpretability is thus limited, at least under 
the presently supposed boundary conditions.  
3PSM 
According to the adjusted 3PSM model, verbal tools for credibility assessment distinguish 
between experience-based and fabricated statements with a large effect size and moderate to large 
effects in the confidence interval. In about 74%, experience-based statements had descriptively 
higher scores than fabricated statements. The method performance check showed that 3PSM 
performed well under all selected conditions.  
INTEGRATION OF THE META-ANALYTIC FINDINGS 
Now we have a multitude of results to answer the question of whether verbal tools for credibility 
assessment work. These results range from a null effect to a large point estimation. While REMA, 
trim-and-fill, p-uniform, WAAP, and 3PSM indicated that the procedures work more or less well, 
PET-PEESE showed a null effect. However, according to the method performance check with 
the Meta-Showdown Explorer, only 3PSM performed well under the preselected conditions, all 
other meta-analytic findings were of limited value. Based on this weighting, it can be assumed 
that verbal tools for credibility assessment are valid to a substantial degree. Yet, we must consider 
high heterogeneity between studies that could not be resolved by separate analysis per procedure 
or moderator analyses. This limits the interpretability of point estimates using 3PSM. The 
question arises whether the included studies are actually a sample of one population. As discussed 
in Meta-Analysis 1, differences in the study designs, although not identified by moderator 
analyses, might have addressed different underlying mechanisms of truth telling and lying, so that 
the same measures performed differently in individual studies. 
ARE CBCA, RM, AND SCAN EQUALLY VALID?  
SCAN 
Based on a meta-analysis using 3PSM on the subset of seven SCAN studies, we conclude that 
this procedure cannot discriminate between experience-based and fabricated statements and 
should therefore not be used in practice. Although Sapir’s homepage advertises that “SCAN will 
solve every case […] quickly and easily” (http://www.lsiscan.com/intro_to_scan.htm), the lack 
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of any theoretical and/or empirical basis indicates that SCAN cannot be considered to be a 
scientific instrument. Vrij (2015) concluded that the Daubert standards are not met for SCAN, 
except for the first question of whether its validity can be tested – however, the quality of 
research and its results are not sufficient. This assumption was supported by our findings: The 
adjusted 3PSM model revealed a large but statistically non-significant point estimate. The CLES 
of 84% is thus misleading. Only two studies fell into the interval of significant p-values (Driscoll, 
1994; Smith, 2001). Both were field studies that used questionable criteria to establish ground 
truth. Driscoll (1994) used, among others, results of polygraph tests to determine the truth status 
of the statements. The polygraph tests have not been described, but since available polygraph 
tests have been heavily criticized (e.g., Meijer et al., 2016), the validity of this ground truth 
criterion is in question. Smith (2001) used, among others, the criterion police dropped the case. It is 
unclear to what extent the assessment of the credibility of statements (among other factors, such 
as unbalanced ground truth ratios) had influenced the police investigations. The assessment of a 
statement as deceptive could have led to dropping the case. In this circumstance, the ground 
truth criterion police dropped the case would not have been independent from the quality assessment 
of statements. Against this background, it is debatable whether the two positive study effects are 
valid at all. Either way, it must be stressed that the widespread use of SCAN is alarming if 
compared to the small number of empirical studies and their aggregated effect size.  
CBCA 
A meta-analysis using 3PSM on the subset of CBCA studies revealed a large point estimate with 
moderate to large effects in the confidence interval indicating that in 73% of the cases 
experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores than fabricated statements. Even 
though this rate is well below 100%, the CBCA is one of the best methods to distinguish between 
experience-based and fabricated statements (see comparison to other measures in CONCLUSION 
of Meta-Analysis 1). Furthermore, it should be noted that its application is only one part of the 
SVA. Beyond the assessment of statement quality, personal and contextual variables are taken 
into account (e.g., Steller, 1989), although the validity of this largely unstructured procedure has 
yet to be empirically demonstrated. 
RM 
As for CBCA, a meta-analysis using 3PSM on the subset of RM studies revealed a large point 
estimate with small to large effect sizes in the confidence interval indicating that in about 70% 
experience-based statements had descriptively higher scores than fabricated statements. The same 
applies here as to the CBCA: Even though this rate is far below 100%, RM is one of the best 
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methods available to discriminate between experience-based and fabricated statements (see 
comparison to other measures in CONCLUSION of Meta-Analysis 1). However, RM has so far only 
been investigated in laboratory studies, the examination in the field is still pending. 
WHAT ARE OPTIMAL BOUNDARY CONDITIONS? 
FIELD VS. LABORATORY STUDIES 
Moderator analyses revealed that field studies outperformed laboratory studies. This finding 
corroborates the validity of verbal tools for credibility assessment for practical application: 
Experience-based and fabricated statements made in real cases could have been distinguished, at 
least to an acceptable extent. However, it should be noted again that in many cases the 
independence of ground truth criteria and statement quality is questionable and that the results 
may therefore be overestimated. On the other hand, this finding underpins the difficulty of 
experimentally imitating real cases in the laboratory. It is unethical to create scenarios resembling 
the experience of sexual abuse or similar offences of forensic interest. In order to approximate 
real case scenarios in an ethically acceptable manner, Steller (1989) recommended designing 
laboratory situations that affect participants personally, are perceived negatively, and are 
accompanied by a certain degree of loss of control (e.g., being witness of a wallet theft while 
playing a computer game, birth). Moderator analyses revealed no difference between studies that 
operationalized these criteria and those that did not. However, as the example “being witness of a 
wallet theft while playing a computer game” shows, even when these criteria are taken into 
account, it is difficult to create a situation in the laboratory that is even remotely as invasive as a 
real case scenario involving sexual victimization.  
NUMBER OF CBCA CRITERIA 
Moderator analyses on the extended data set confirmed the previous finding that the complete 
version of 19 CBCA criteria outperformed any incomplete criteria set. As explained above, this 
difference may be due to differences in the ecological validity of study designs. Studies that 
investigate the complete set of criteria usually provide settings in which all criteria could occur. 
On the other hand, studies that exclude individual criteria show less realistic settings. 
Independent of this, according to classical test theory the test length of the entire criteria set 
might have increased the validity. 
DECISION BASIS 
As in Meta-Analysis 1, we found statistically significant differences between studies comparing 
mean scores of experience-based and fabricated statements and studies classifying statements via 
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statistical decisions. Again, the latter worked better, which, as described in detail above, could be 
explained by the weighting of criteria in discriminant analysis. However, as previously noted, 
criteria weighting needs to be cross-validated, as it is modeled and tested on the same sample. 
Yet, only three of the 24 studies using discriminant analysis carried out cross-validation. 
Moderator analyses showed no difference between studies that carried out cross-validation and 
those that did not, which could have been due to the low statistical power of the subsets of 
studies carrying out cross-validation. It is therefore highly likely that the effect size of studies 
using statistical decisions is overestimated. In addition to these results, moderator analyses 
showed that classifications based on rater decisions outperformed mean score comparisons. 
Even though the underlying psychological processes of rater decisions are untraceable, it can be 
assumed that criteria are taken into account to varying degrees – either weighted by their 
diagnostic value (Maier et al., 2018) or according to personal and contextual aspects (e.g., Volbert 
& Steller, 2014) – or are even partially ignored. As with discriminant analysis, this could be the 
explanation for larger effect sizes.  
FURTHER MODERATORS 
As for the data set of 52 studies, further moderator analyses (i.e., on publication status, year of 
publication, participants’ age, motivation, experience status, role in the interview, and training 
status, as well as on type of lie, statement mode, experience of raters, and scoring of criteria) 
yielded no statistically significant results. Again, for some of these variables, this might be due to 
low-powered (small subsets) and heterogeneous moderator categories, and others might not have 
been identified. However, this does not mean that there are no other moderators (see 
DISCUSSION of Meta-Analysis 1). 
WHAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE RESEARCH? 
In the discussion of Meta-Analysis 1, we pointed to several aspects that future studies need to 
take into account in order to make progress in research on verbal tools for credibility assessment 
and to empirically legitimize their use: standardization of procedures, consideration of several 
boundary conditions, and design of ecologically valid studies. These calls do also apply on the 
basis of the extended data set in Meta-Analysis 2.  
In addition, the method performance check demonstrated the importance to reduce publication 
bias and QRPs. Accordingly, the performance of most meta-analytic methods decreased 
dramatically when a certain amount of bias was preselected in the Meta-Showdown Explorer. 
Although the results of p-curve analysis and moderator analysis gave no indication of bias in the 
present data set, its existence cannot be entirely ruled out. In order to further reduce the 
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possibility of publication bias and QRPs, future studies should be pre-registered. If, for example, 
it is determined in advance how many statements are gathered, on what basis these are compared 
(i.e., which criteria are coded and how), and which analyses are performed, researchers’ degrees 
of freedom decrease. This way, pre-registration protects against (un)intentional p-hacking. The 
prevention of validity-threatening biases of course also requires structural changes in the 
scientific community (e.g., changes in publication practice, changes in how researchers’ 
performance is assessed). Moreover, future studies must include larger samples. The WAAP 
demonstrated that only 34% of the studies had a statistical power above 80%. This finding 
corresponds to the generally low statistical power in psychological research (Bakker et al., 2012) 
and should be a call for proper power analyses. 
Moreover, the method performance check showed that a high amount of true variance between 
the studies limited the performance of most meta-analytic methods. Although the cause of 
heterogeneity could not be identified, it can be assumed that different paradigms addressed 
(different) underlying mechanisms of truth telling and lying to a varying extent. As discussed in 
Meta-Analysis 1, it is of course important to examine the validity of verbal tools for credibility 
assessment in various study settings. However, it needs to be specified in advance, as precisely as 
possible, which paradigm is used to address which processes. In this way, the comparability of 
studies could be increased and heterogeneity decreased.  
CONCLUSION 
We applied six meta-analytic methods to verify the robustness of the previous findings of Meta-
Analysis 1. The results had a large range including conflicting conclusions from “verbal tools for 
credibility assessment do not work” to “verbal tools for credibility assessment do work”. If we 
look at the weighted sum of these findings, there are, however, sound indications that CBCA and 
RM discriminate between experience-based and fabricated statements. In contrast, we strongly 
advise against using SCAN. Thus, on the basis of the method performance check, we gave the 
most weight to the results of 3PSM. Results of the other meta-analytic methods were of limited 
value, at least under the preselected conditions in the Meta-Showdown Explorer. The present 
selection was based on theoretical and empirical considerations concerning true effect size, 
severity of publication bias, QRPs environment, amount of heterogeneity, and number of studies 
in meta-analysis. However, it should be critically noted that these considerations are partly based 
on the results of Meta-Analysis 1, which are in turn of limited value according to the method 
performance check. Of course (with findings of future research) other preselections could be set. 
Criteria for good performance were chosen to minimize the Type I error, as it would be fatal to 
use methods that do not distinguish between experience-based and fabricated statements. 
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On the basis of their simulation study, Carter et al. (2019) pointed out that “researchers in 
psychology should not expect to produce a conclusive, debate-ending result by conducting a 
meta-analysis on an existing literature. Instead, we imagine meta-analyses may serve best to draw 
attention to the existing strengths and/or weaknesses in a literature […], and these results can 
then inspire a careful re-examination of methodology and theory, perhaps followed by large-scale, 
preregistered replication efforts” (p. 20). This suggestion applies here: The present results 
revealed a multitude of considerations on how future research could obtain (more) meaningful 
data in the field of verbal credibility assessment through pre-registered, adequately powered, and 
internally as well as ecologically valid studies.  
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  OUTLOOK 
The weighted sum of the present meta-analytical results demonstrated that CBCA and RM 
distinguish to a substantial degree between experience-based and fabricated statements, whereas 
SCAN does not. However, several boundary conditions of verbal tools for credibility assessment 
as well as methodical limitations of meta-analyses must be taken into account when interpreting 
the empirical evidence. In addition, our findings revealed a number of issues that need to be 
addressed in future research. Beyond these considerations based on the present data, I would like 
to refer to the calls of the first international workshop on verbal lie detection. In the course of 
the workshop, nine scientists and three practitioners gathered the major problems of research on 
verbal cues of credibility assessment and derived implications for future studies in a series of 
commentaries (Nahari et al., 2019). 
Nahari (Commentary #2), for example, stressed the importance of establishing a strong 
theoretical foundation to a priori specify why certain cues work under what conditions. A study 
on RM showed that the difference in details between experience-based and fabricated statements 
decreased when statements were made after a certain time delay as compared to immediately after 
an event (Nahari, 2018). Although truth tellers still reported more details than liars, with a time 
lag of two weeks the number of true details decreased in both groups. However, liars 
compensated for this decrease with an increase of fabricated details, so that the difference in the 
total number of details declined. Since in practice statements are often made after a delay, Nahari 
(2018) called to examine this finding more closely and supplement the memory source 
monitoring approach with considerations that include strategic acting of liars (e.g., including 
details that cannot be verified, Verifiability Approach). 
In Commentary #3, Taylor, Maroño, and Warmelink addressed the problem that study results 
based on group comparisons between scores of experience-based and fabricated statements say 
little about whether an individual’s score indicates truth or lie. To determine the diagnostic power 
of verbal tools for credibility assessment, criteria are needed to decide at which point a statement 
is classified as experience-based or fabricated. Based on two criteria, the authors calculated 
classification rates for two study sets, which compared experience-based and fabricated 
statements in their number of details under different conditions. If one accepts a 50% false alarm 
rate, hit rates in both study sets did not exceed 75%. Without risking any false accusation, the 
average hit rate was only 40%. Hence, the authors do not consider the criterion details to be 
suitable for distinguishing between experience-based and fabricated statements in individual 
cases. This example illustrates that it is necessary to calculate classification rates under different 
criteria in order to determine the suitability of verbal cues. 
 78 
In Commentary #4, Masip pointed out that future research needs to search for lie criteria. The 
CBCA contains only indicators of truth. The absence of criteria can be due to different reasons 
and cannot be clearly traced back to deception. If a statement is a little elaborate and detailed, one 
must conclude that the lie hypothesis cannot be rejected, but cannot be confirmed either. 
Although the RM approach contains one lie criterion (cognitive operation), its empirical support is 
limited and, thus, the performance for lie detection weak. Addressing this problem, Vrij, Leal, 
and Fisher (Commentary #5) presented an index composed of one truth criterion (complications) 
and two lie criteria (common knowledge details, self-handicapping strategies): complications/(complications + 
common knowledge details + self-handicapping strategies). A higher value indicates an experience-based 
statement, a lower value a fabricated statement. So far, the index has been examined in five 
studies (Vrij, Leal, Jupe, & Harvey, 2018; Vrij, Leal, et al., 2017; Vrij, Leal, Fisher, et al., 2018; 
Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, Dalton, et al., 2018; Vrij, Leal, Mann, Fisher, Jo, et al., 2018) and 
outperformed the verbal cue total detail, which was considered to be the strongest cue for 
truthfulness to date (Amado et al., 2015). Hence, it seems worthwhile to follow this approach, 
even if truth tellers do not always use less common knowledge details and liars do not always use self-
handicapping strategies. The authors considered how these differences could be amplified (e.g., by 
using certain interview protocols).  
These comments are exemplary of a total of eleven problems that researchers and practitioners 
have identified (for further commentaries see Nahari et al., 2019). On the basis of their 
statements, the authors called for theoretically based and ecologically adaptable solutions for field 
challenges to be achieved by a Theory-Protocol-Procedure: Researchers should provide a theoretical 
and empirical basis for verbal tools for credibility assessment while practitioners should carry out 
their implementation in the field. In addition, the authors claimed not to pursue a one-size-fits-all 
approach, but rather to specify conditions under which verbal tools work or their use is limited. 
As Granhag concluded in Commentary #1, we should not leave it to others to contextualize our 
results. Finally, the authors referred to the group to individual inference challenge (G2i; Faigman, 
Monahan, Slobogin, 2014), i.e., the question of whether and how scientific knowledge derived 
from studying groups can be used in individual cases. In order to answer the question of how to 
convert group averages to individual classification (see Commentary #3), future research need to 
specify a cut-off criterion that applies not only to one study, but rather provide general acceptable 
sensitivity and specificty. 
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Verbal tools for credibility assessment make use of the fact that “At least, lying is thinking the 
truth” (Oliver Hassenkamp, translated from German). Lying requires recognizing that the social 
context demands certain information and producing a statement that is considered to be true. To 
accomplish these tasks, liars use strategic considerations that consume cognitive resources 
(Walczyk et al., 2014). Verbal tools for credibility assessment suppose that these psychological 
processes are reflected in verbal cues. The present data demonstrated the CBCA and RM belong 
to the most promising approaches. Nevertheless, both approaches have limitations that make 
their use difficult to impossible under certain conditions. There are intensive efforts to specify 
their validity more closely and to optimize the procedures. However, this research faces various 
methodical challenges. Since the use of verbal tools for credibility assessment has far-reaching 
consequences, it is essential that future studies actively address these challenges and meet the 
highest methodical standards in order to achieve meaningful results. 
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Appendix A 
Data table 
Study ID Authors (year) Description of effect size 
basis 
Page/ table 
42 Akehurst, Bull, Vrij, & Köhnken (2004) Acutal involvement vs. 
fabricated; calculation of 
CBCA score 
p. 887, Table 3 
12 Akehurst, Köhnken, & Höfer (2001)   p. 74, Table 3 
13 Akehurst, Manton, & Quandte (2011) Both raters combined p. 240 
60 Bensi, Gambetti, Nori, & Giusberti (2009) Within-subjects design;  
overall CBCA score 
p. 114, Table 2 
17 Berger (2005)   p. 303, Table 4-75 
7 Blandon-Gitlin, Pezdek, Rogers, & 
Brodie (2005) 
 p. 193 
52 Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij (2014) Condition: Explanation; CBCA  p. 158, Table 3 
52.2 Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij (2014) Condition: Explanation; RM  p. 158, Table 3 
52.3 Bogaard, Meijer, & Vrij (2014) Condition: Explanation; SCAN  p. 158, Table 3 
58 Bogaard, Meijer, Vrij, & Merckelbach 
(2016) 
 p. 5 
27 Bond & Lee (2005)   p. 322, Table 2 
61 Bradford (2006)  p. 152 
68 Connolly & Lavoie (2015)  p. 16 
19 Craig, Scheibe, Raskin, Kircher, & Dodd 
(1999) 
 p. 82 
71 Discroll (1994)   p. 84, Table 3 
16 Dolezych (2006) Calculation of CBCA score 
without the following criteria: 
Lebensgewohnheiten, 
Erinnerungsbemühen, 
Zuschreiben negativer 
Eigenschaften, Klischees 
p. 75 
53 Elntib, Wagstaff, & Wheatcroft (2014) Before word count 
standardization; RM  
p. 8, Table 1 
20 Fiegler (2009) Results of discriminant 
function 4 
p. 101, Table 5.17 
35 Gödert, Gamer, Rill, & Vossel (2005) Witnesses vs. perpetrators p. 235 
62 Granhag, Strömwall, & Landström (2006) CBCA  p. 91, Table 3 
62.2 Granhag, Strömwall, & Landström (2006) RM  p. 91, Table 3 
63 Hänert (2007) Group A vs. group C p. 108, Table 13 
67 Heinze (1996)   p. 90, Table 6 
69 Hermann & Jena (1995) Statements of both 
participants combined 
p. 86, p. 90 
47 Jang, Kim, Cho, & Lee (2013) RM  p. 5, Table 2 
32 Janka (2003) Rater 1 and 2 combined p. 111, Table 20 
64 Joffe (1992) Experienced vs. lightly 
coached 
p. 119, Table 6 
65 Joffe (1992) Experienced vs. lightly 
coached 
p. 116, Table 4 
5 Köhnken, Schimossek, Aschermann, & 
Höfer (1995) 
  p. 679, Table 5 
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Appendix A (continued)   
Study ID Authors (year) Description of effect size 
basis 
Page/ table 
3 Krahe & Kundrotas (1992)   p. 611, Table 6 
15 Lamb et al. (1997) Very likely and quite likely as 
well as very unlikely and quite 
unlikely combined 
p. 260, Table 2 
11 Landry & Brigham (1992) Trained participants p. 671, Table 3 
49 Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher 
(2015) 
Study 1 p. 137 
50 Leal, Vrij, Warmelink, Vernham, & Fisher 
(2015) 
Study 2 p. 141 
54 Logue, Book, Frosina, Huizinga, & Amos 
(2015) 
Calculation of RM score p. 365, Table 1 
22 Lüdke (2008)   p. 40, Table 11 
2 Memon, Fraser, Colwell, Odinot, & 
Mastroberardino (2010) 
RM version 1 and 2 combined pp. 9 
6 Merckelbach (2004) High and low fantasy prone 
participants combined 
p. 1379, Table 2 
66 Metzger (1996)   p. 84, Table 10 
66.2 Metzger (1996)   p. 88, Table 13 
56 Nahari & Pazuelo (2015) Information on informed truth 
tellers and liars via email 
 
55 Nahari (2017) Forensic context; information 
on SD in false condition via 
email 
pp. 236 
34 Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher (2012) Innocents vs. concealment, 
RM  
p. 74, Table 3 
34.2 Nahari, Vrij, & Fisher (2012) Innocents vs. concealment, 
SCAN  
p. 74, Table 3 
40 Naumann (2005) Controlgroup (mothers) vs. 
experimental group (trained 
non-mothers) 
p. 94, Table 22 
45 Niehaus (2000) True statements vs. 
reproduction with experience 
p. 285, Table 53 
30 Parker & Brown (2000) CBCA  p. 244, Table 1 
21 Porter & Yuille (1996)  p. 451 
21.2 Porter & Yuille (1996)   p. 450, Table 1 
18 Roma, San Martini, Sabatello, Tatarelli, 
& Ferracuti (2011) 
Total sample (male and 
female) 
p. 617, Table 3 
4 Ruby & Brigham (1998) White and black speakers as 
well as first and second 
sample combined 
p. 383, Table 5 
41 Rutta (2001)   p. 78, Table 9 
29 Santtila, Roppola, Runtti, & Niemi (2000) CBCA  p. 175, Table 7 
10 Schelleman-Offermans & Merckelbach 
(2010) 
High and low fantasy prone 
participants combined 
p. 255, Tale 2 
8 Short & Bodner (2011)  p. 5 
59 Smith (2001) Experienced SCAN users p. 18, Table 4 
23 Sporer & Küpper (1995)  p. 183 
24 Sporer & Sharman (2006) Other ratings p. 847, Table 4 
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Appendix A (continued)   
Study ID Authors (year) Description of effect size 
basis 
Page/ table 
39 Sporer (1997) CBCA  p. 383 
39.2 Sporer (1997) RM  p. 384 
25 Steck et al. (2010) Truth statements vs. 
fabricated statements 
p. 13, Table 4 
28 Steller, Wellershaus, & Wolf (1992) Calculation of CBCA score p. 165, Table 2 
51 Strömwall & Granhag (2005)  p. 351 
33 Strömwall, Bengtsson, Leander, & 
Granhag (2004) 
CBCA  p. 662 
33.2 Strömwall, Bengtsson, Leander, & 
Granhag (2004) 
RM  p. 663 
14 Tye, Amato, Honts, Devitt, & Peters 
(1999) 
 p. 101 
57 Vanderhallen, Jaspaert, & Vervaeke 
(2015) 
SCAN pp. 6, Table 2, Table 
3 
1 Vrij & Mann (2006) Interviewphase 1+2 combined p. 345 
36 Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull (2004a) CBCA total score p. 24, Table 2 
36.2 Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull (2004a) RM total score p. 24, Table 2 
8 Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull (2004b) CBCA  p. 121 
38.2 Vrij, Akehurst, Soukara, & Bull (2004b) RM  p. 121 
31 Vrij, Edward, & Bull (2001) CBCA  p. 905, Table 1 
31.2 Vrij, Edward, & Bull (2001) RM  p. 905, Table 1 
48 Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull (2000) CBCA  p. 250, Table 1 
48.2 Vrij, Edward, Roberts, & Bull (2000) RM  p. 250, Table 1 
46 Vrij, Kneller, & Mann (2000) True vs. informed liars p. 63, Table 1 
43 Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher (2007) All three interview styles 
combined; CBCA  
p. 508, Table 1 
43.2 Vrij, Mann, Kristen, & Fisher (2007) All three interview styles 
combined; RM  
p. 508, Table 1 
70 Wehner (2006) "Glaubhaftigkeitsindex (GI)" p. 278, Table 21 
44 Willén & Strömwall (2012) CBCA total score p. 353, Table 2 
44.2 Willén & Strömwall (2012) RM total score p. 354, Table 3 
26 Wolf & Steller (1997)  p. 129 
37 Wrege (2004) Trained participants p. 80, Table 6a 
9 Zaparniuk, Yuille, & Taylor (1995) Event 1 and 2, coder 1, 2, and 
3, and decision rule 1 and 2 
combined 
p. 348, Table 3 
Note. A description of effect size basis is only provided if a study included several comparisons of experience-
based and fabricated statements based on one sample. 
 
  
 
Appendix B 
Coding manual 
Column name Description Coding 
Study ID Study IDs ranging from 1-71 
Study IDs ending with XX.2 or XX.3 have been additionally used for subset meta-
analyses of the individual verbal tools for credibility assessment 
 
Authors (year) Authors and year of publication  
Jrnl Journal name  
Pub Type of publication  0 = unpublished 
1 = published 
VT Verbal tools for credibility assessment 1= CBCA 
2 = RM 
3 = SCAN 
Dsgn Study design 0 = field study 
1 = laboratory study 
WithinBetween Within-subjects study design: participants provide experience-based and fabricated 
statement  
Between-subjects study design: participants either provide experience-based or 
fabricated statement  
Only rated in laboratory studies 
0 = within-subjects design 
1 = between-subjects design 
Male Number of male participants  
Female Number of female participants  
SexRatio Ratio of female and male participants 0 = all men to 1 = all women 
Ntotal Total number of fabricated and experience-based statements  
  
 
Appendix B (continued)  
Column name Description Coding 
Nlie Number of fabricated statements  
Ntrue Number of experience-based statements  
Age Age of participants 0 < 18 
1 ≥ 18 
Motivation Financial or other motivating incentive to make a convincing statement 
Only rated in laboratory studies 
0 = no incentive 
1 = incentive 
ConcealOut Type of lie 
Concealment lie: statement is partly based on true aspects 
Outright lie: completely fabricated statement  
Only rated in laboratory studies 
0 = concealment lie 
1 = outright lie 
Event Experienced event is characterized by negative emotional tone, personal involvement, 
and loss of control 
Only rated in laboratory studies 
0 = at least one criteria is missing 
1 = all three criteria are met 
Experienced Experience status I 
Event was either not personally experienced, i.e., participants watched a movie, or 
personally experienced 
Only rated in laboratory studies 
 
0 = not personally experienced 
1 = personally experienced  
Accused Experience status II 
Participants either were accused or not accused of having done something 
Only rated in laboratory studies 
 
 
0 = not accused 
1 = accused 
  
 
Appendix B (continued)  
Column name Description Coding 
CBCACriteria Set of CBCA criteria 0 = any incomplete set of CBCA criteria 
1 = complete set of 19 CBCA criteria (Steller & 
Köhnken, 1989) 
2 = 14-item version (Raskin, Esplin, & Horowitz, 
1991) 
Scoring Scoring of the criteria 0 = present/ absent 
1 = rating on a Likert-scale 
Training Subjects were trained in providing criteria of verbal tools for credibility assessment; only 
rated in laboratory studies 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
Statement Mode of the statement 0 = oral 
1 = written 
Rater Laypersons: received no training in the procedure used 
Trained raters: received training in the procedure used 
Professionals: work in the field of forensic statement assessment 
0 = laypersons 
1 = trained raters 
2 = professionals 
OverallES Study used for overall effect size estimation or only for subset meta-analyses 0 = not used  
1 = used 
dbase Decision basis for the classification of the statements as experience-based or fabricated 0 = discriminant function 
1 = rater decision 
2 = mean comparison of scores 
3 = a priori decision rule 
Crossval Correction for potential overestimation of results based on discriminant analysis by cross 
validation 
0 = no 
1 = yes 
d Cohen’s d  
  
 
Appendix B (continued)  
Column name Description Coding 
d_v Variance of Cohen’s d  
d_se Standard error of Cohen’s d  
g Hedges’ g  
g_v Variance of Hedges’ g  
g_se Standard error of Hedges’ g  
invarwe Inverse variance weight  
t_obs Observed t-value  
 
